



PERSONALITY PREVAILS

C. V. CRABB





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PERSONALITY PREVAILS

or
*The Human Equation
in a Machine Age*

By
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CLARKSDALE, MISS.

Author of Psychology's Challenge to Christianity

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DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER

FOREWORD



DR. CRABB needs no word of mine to secure for him a large circle of readers. His *Psychology's Challenge to Christianity* has already made many friends for him. He has won his spurs in this realm, and he seems now to have a sharper lance and a firmer seat in the saddle than before. I am glad, however, to express my appreciation of what he has done.

Some years ago, Bishop Slattery, in an address to the General Theological Seminary in New York, said that a true psychology of religion could be written only by the active pastor, who knew life at first hand. General psychology needs just as certainly the balancing and correcting influence of experience. One minister has shown that he not only knows men and women as he touches them day in and day out, but that in some amazing way he has had time for wide and discriminating reading, and has been able to master a very complex and difficult field of thought. Such a book should be a challenge and an encouragement to others, who, like him, are immersed in the multitudinous duties of the pastorate, to fight for opportunity to study and write.

No more timely subject could have been chosen than the one with which this work deals. Just yesterday, in Fritz Wittel's review of two of John Watson's books in the *Book League Monthly* for February, I found a reference to Bechterev's *The Principle of Reflexology of the Mind*, and the statement that the Russian government, in an official preface to this book, had declared: "With Bechterev's *Reflexology*, the old psychology is vanquished and dead." When we face the flood of popular books and articles pub-

lished in this country which assure us that psychology has been reduced to physiology, even the stoutest hearted—through their constant suggestion and repetition—begin to wonder if, after all, the field does not belong to the behaviourists. We need someone to steady us, who not only believes in personality, but knows why he believes and can express himself with clarity and power.

A flare for apt illustration and a keen sense of humor belong also to our author. The book was tonic to me. I am sure it will be a help to many others.

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PREFACE



SEVERAL years ago I wrote a book entitled *Psychology's Challenge to Christianity*. The public was kind enough to give it a very good reception. It was used as a text in several of our Christian colleges. At that time I was asked to write a treatise on Christian psychology. Now I did not attempt this for several reasons. One was that I felt my own incompetence for such a colossal task. Another was that I did not believe in a distinctively Christian psychology any more than I believed in a Christian chemistry or a Christian physics or a Christian geology. The spirit of true science demands that we investigate any field untrammelled by any bias even as good a bias as a devotion to the dogmas of the Christian religion. Surely the Christian, of all people, should not be afraid of the facts in the case—and he should set the world an example of a fearless, honest investigation of the data. After all, the believer in God's Supernatural Revelation has nothing whatever to fear from His Natural Revelation in the sphere of science.

Having given up the idea of a Christian psychology, I decided to write a book on personality in its modern setting. Hence I present to the public *The Human Equation*. In that great laboratory of souls, the pastorate, I have had a fine opportunity to study the problem of personality from all angles. In this book I have tried to give a new emphasis on those data that I style "The higher levels of reality." There are few sound books on personality today. I firmly believe that a treatise that investigates the problem of the human equation from a modern standpoint and that takes

into account the various psychological theories and platforms will do much to clear up the present confusion and chaos in that science. There is much work to be done in psychological theory. The important matter now in psychology is the standpoint from which it is written.

I would suggest to teachers of psychology in our Christian colleges that this book can be used as an introduction in psychological theory to the empirical text. I firmly believe that the use of two such texts is the best method for teaching the subject. It is the method that I myself would use if I were teaching the theme. I do not believe that any one single text can be found that will deal adequately with the whole subject.

I hope that *The Human Equation* will be a safe guide and handbook for the general reader. I further hope that it will be of real assistance to the teachers of psychology in our many Christian schools. There is no reason why teachers in other schools should not make use of it. For the guidance of the reader and student I give below a suggested study-outline of this whole fascinating theme with books on various phases of the subject. At the back of the book will be found an outline of various psychological theories with special reference to their attitude to personality. There is also an epitome of some Biblical teachings on psychology. It is earnestly hoped that these various studies will be of assistance to the reader.

Books that deal with personality and lay down various psychological platforms: *The Self and Its World*, by Wilson; *Creative Personality*, by Flewelling; *Human Nature and Its Remaking* and *The Self*, by Hocking; *How We Become Personalities*, by Williams; *The Riddle of Personality*, by Bruce; *The Psychology of Personality*, by Valentine; *The Motives of Men*, by Coe; *Matter and Spirit*, by Pratt; *Personality and Psychology*, by Buckham; *Psy-*

chological Foundations of Religious Education, and The Pedagogy of Jesus in the Twilight of Today, by W. A. Squires; *Philosophy of Religion*, by Ormond; *Idea of the Soul*, by John Laird; *Outline of Psychology*, by Wm. McDougall; *Handbook of Christian Psychology*, by Keyser; *Psychologies of 1925*, by Carl Murchison; *Religious Values and Introduction to Philosophy*, by Brightman; *The Soul Comes Back*, by J. H. Coffin; *The Art of Thinking*, by Ernest Dimnet (this an attempt to restore the personal equation to its primal place at the center of our thinking); *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, by C. G. Jung (a development of the doctrine of the collective unconscious as distinct from the personal unconscious).

Popular expositions of psychology, largely based on behaviouristic foundations: *Why We Behave Like Human Beings*, and *Hows and Whys of Human Behaviour*, by Dorsey; *Exploring Your Mind*, and popular magazine articles, by A. E. Wiggam.

Books that criticize behaviourism: *Mind and Personality*, by Brown; *Behaviourism and Psychology*, by Roback; *The Religion Called Behaviourism*, by Berman (this criticism is the more significant in that it comes from an author who in his *Glands and Personality* practically reduces all that we are to our glandular secretions); *The Misbehaviourists*, by Wickham.

Books that set forth the modern scientific attitude, especially as this is related to spiritual values: *Philosophy, The A B C of Relativity and Sceptical Essays*, by Bertrand Russell; *Science in Search of God*, by Mather; *The New Decalogue of Science*, by A. E. Wiggam; *The New Morality*, by Durant Drake.

Some good texts: *Psychology*, by J. R. Angell; *Psychology*, by Woodworth; *Elements of Human Psychology*,

by Warren; *Psychology*, by Pillsbury; *Psychology*, by William James; *Manual of Psychology*, by G. F. Stout; *Introduction to Psychology*, by Calkins; *General Psychology*, by Hunter; *Psychology, General and Applied*, by Hugo Muensterberg.

Books on the relation of Psychology to Christianity: *Psychology and the Christian Life*, by Pym; *More Psychology and the Christian Life*, by Pym; *Christianity and Psychology*, by Barry; *Recent Psychology and the Christian Life*, by Hudson; *New Psychology and the Christian Faith*, by Spurr; *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, by Hickman; *Psychology of Religious Experience*, by Strickland; *The Religious Consciousness*, by Pratt; *The Psychology of Religion*, by Selbie; *Psychology of Christian Life and Behavior*, by Bruce; *The Old Testament and Modern Problems in Psychology*, by Major Povah; *Psychology's Challenge to Christianity*, by Crabb.

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PERSONALITY PREVAILS

CHAPTER I

A VITAL ISSUE



THE scene was one of the eating clubs at Princeton Seminary. The author and a friend were having one of those perennial debates, for which a school of the prophets is famous. This time it was not about divine sovereignty and free agency or a question of German Higher Criticism but as to whether man is a soul or a machine. The author was defending the soul side of this great issue. The controversy waxed warm. After the smoke of battle had cleared away, it was a peace without victory. For, as is the case in theological and political debates, each one of the auditors, following his hidden will-to-believe and will-to-select the evidence, held to the same opinion still. But a few days later this same friend confided to me, "I don't see how you can preach with any zeal or fire. I cannot, when I consider that man is only a machine." Thus his view of man had cut the nerve of his preaching. A wrong view of personality will cut the nerve of this machine age. The modern world is adrift on a sea of mechanism and needs to get a new orientation in regard to personality. To examine the question of the soul in the light of present-day conditions, and to enable man to keep his nerve in a machine age is the purpose of this book. What is the import of this question, "Man or machine?"

I

It is of vital concern to the common man. There have been times in the past when the rights and privileges of the plain man have not been given much consideration.

But we are not so cocksure today that the common mind is totally wrong in every case. There are some advantages that the common-sense individual has over the technical student. For one thing, he still holds to the native intuitions of the mind, and has not distorted the original light from these sources of truth by too much speculation and study. Now these native intuitions should not be brushed aside with one fell swoop by the iron hand of mechanism. They have given us some of our finest traditions and most fundamental truths in philosophy, art and religion. The race has followed their findings all these years, and has not run into a cul de sac.

Another strong point about the common man is that he looks at the universe as a whole and not at some specialized segment. We need the specialist—his research, his conclusions, his theories. But the danger of specialization is that the student will get his nose so close to certain facts, will so fall in love with his own narrow segment of truth that he will endeavour to interpret life in the light of his own studies and thus will get a warped view. The world of thought in psychology, philosophy and science is suffering today from the half-baked conclusions of the super-specialist. Now the views of the common mind are a wholesome antidote to this. The common man looks at the world in a large, coherent, full orbéd manner, and often his findings and conclusions are nearer the truth than those of the super-specialist, who persists in keeping his nose too close to the grind stone of his pet experimentation. Finally, the common man is immersed in the stream of living experience and is not marooned on some little island of it, as is often the case with the specialist. Not being detached from life as a whole and with his ear close to the whole current of

daily living, he often can interpret experience more truly than the hyper-technical student.

Having vindicated the right of the common mind to consideration, let us then note that the average man has a vital interest in all psychological problems. He is reading books on psychology and philosophy as never before. He eagerly scans articles in the current magazines that tell him how to get added power, poise and plenty thru the operation of his subconscious mind. He eagerly drinks in everything that the Chautauqua lecturer tells him about the power of his subjective mind, and how the ideas planted therein can influence his health, his sleep and his moral and spiritual welfare in general. This is a day when men "psychologize" everything. If the 17th century was the theological age, the 18th the philosophical, and the 19th the biological, the 20th is pre-eminently the era of psychology. The idea is abroad today that if I can only psychologize a subject—whether it be advertising, politics, or religion—I have not only succeeded in giving a description of how the mind functions in this field, but that I have given a real explanation of the final causes and unearthed the secret forces that explain everything in this study. In other words, we have the idea that when we have given the psychology of any subject, we have said the last word as to its origin, history and rationale. We have the erroneous notion that psychology can tell us not only the "how" but also the "why." With many thinkers psychology has essayed to take the place not only of science but also of philosophy and theology. Such is the mental atmosphere in which the average mind lives and functions. Surely then it needs guidance as to the great line of cleavage between mechanistic and purposive psychologies. Most of the popu-

lar articles that it reads are predicated on the psychological platforms of the behaviorist or Freud. It seldom comes in contact with any articles of a popular nature that uphold the presence of a real personality in man's psychic life. Hence this whole matter of the status of personality in present-day psychology is of vital concern to the average man.

II

In the next place, I would note the importance of this question of personality to psychology. As I have indicated in the introduction, the all-important question in psychology is the platform on which it is written. Psychologies written from the standpoint of behaviorism or spiritual personality are so radically different that they would seem to belong to two separate and distinct sciences. Psychological theory is the vital issue today. The treatment by the various platforms of such elemental matters as thinking, feeling and willing is most diverse.

Let us consider the matter of a man's thinking. If there is any aspect of the human ego, whose exercise and conclusions would not be called into question, we would believe that it is the thinking function. Did not the father of modern introspection begin his philosophizing with the dictum, "I think, therefore, I am"? We had thought that all modern philosophy and psychology were postulated on the inviolability and sacredness of the intellectual process. In college I struggled thru the writings of John Locke down to the skepticism of David Hume. I wept philosophic tears over the demise of all science, philosophy, and psychology. I was thrilled with delight when that crusader for pure thought, Immanuel Kant, was aroused

from his dogmatic slumbers and sallied forth to battle for the sacredness of the thinking processes. I felt that thinking was a noble, sublime act. Whether I had studied its processes in the pages of Kant, or delighted over its presence in the plays of Shakespeare, I had held it to be a lofty, almost inspired act of the subject. The sense of meaning I had held to be pivotal to all investigation in science, to all speculation in philosophy, to all appreciation of good literature, to all adjustment to environment. But the sense of meaning is no longer held sacred. Thinking has fallen from its high and lofty pedestal. John Watson tells us that we think whenever by a subvocal use of our language organization we can escape from a situation to which we are not adjusted. Thinking is subvocal talking. All idea of meaning is surrendered. We get a new verbal creation by manipulating words until a new pattern is hit upon. Surely we have come a long way from Immanuel Kant. We had never dreamed that thinking would be equated with talking. Often they have existed in inverse ratio. Bertrand Russell says in his *Philosophy* (page 10) that Watson in every day life gives as much evidence of thinking as does anybody else. We surmise that all behaviorists make use of meaning in their daily adjustments. We are bringing all this out to make plain the fundamentally different conclusions in psychology that ensue from the various platforms that are adopted.

Next, I would note the diverse treatments of the emotions. The old psychology has perhaps erred in giving too intellectualistic a theory of the feelings. But in general the old view held that it was the reaction of the whole personality to a given situation. Man in the presence of a given situation manifested an attitude of pain or joy, and

this attitude led usually to a will adjustment to the environment in hand. An emotion was a stirring up of the whole personality, and embraced certain cognitive aspects. The Bible makes much use of the emotion of love in its own psychology of religion. In the 21st chapter of John we have the celebrated restitution of Simon Peter to the favor of the Christ. Jesus appears to His dispirited disciples on the Beloved Lake. In verses 6-12, describing the miraculous draught of fishes, Jesus gives them a new parable of their future service in catching men. In verse 12, where He bids them to come and dine, He calls them to a new communion with Himself. In verses 15-17, where He asks Peter the historic question, "Lovest thou me more than these," He calls Simon and, in fact, all of them to a new motive for service. Love for Him is to be the new dynamic. It is a searching, probing examination of the worldly disciple. Love for Christ is to be the basis of the new relationship. Ringing down the centuries as a sort of spiritual psycho-analysis for us all, come the words, "Lovest thou me more than these?" Love is to be the sacred talisman that is to settle our real spiritual condition. Now this lofty emotion of love whether in the scriptures or in any sound psychology of religion is always predicated on the fact of personality.

It is the attitude of pain or pleasure of an ego. How different is the interpretation of the emotional life on psychological platforms that are not purposive. Dorsey in his book, *Why We Behave Like Human Beings*, holds that our emotions are functions of the autonomic system. There are three divisions of this. The upper or cranial is concerned with the joys and sorrows of life. The lower or sacral covers the emptying mechanisms of the large in-

testine and urogenital system. Between the cranial and sacral is the sympathetic division. It dilates the pupils of the eyes, hurries up the heartbeat, stands the hair on end, opens the sweat glands, stops the movement in the stomach and releases adrenin. John B. Watson says our emotions are conditioned pattern reactions, and are based on the three primary responses of fear, rage and love. Now there is a whole universe of difference between these naturalistic interpretations of the emotions and the more personal one given above. When Christ made His appeal to Peter on the Beloved Lake was it primarily to his autonomic system, to his conditioned patterns reactions, or to a purposeful, responsible person who had the power to love Him and to shape his destiny accordingly?

Then note the diverse treatments of the will on the part of the differing psychologies. With the older psychologies the will was the imperial part of man that in the light of the findings of the intellect and the attitude of the emotions, blazed the trail of the whole personality for weal or woe, for heaven or hell. In any sound psychology of religion, the will must be reached, must be trained for service and be properly oriented in the moral and spiritual universe. Even as late a psychologist as James gives the will an intellectualistic interpretation. He has his theory of ideo motor action, according to which every idea that is before the bar of consciousness has a certain relative dynamic power and drive. When several diverse ideas are before the bar, the decision will depend on which set of notions has the greatest dynamic power and gains the victory. But with the coming of new types of psychology all this is changed. John Watson hardly speaks of the will at all. Other thinkers practically neglect it as a faculty of the

ego. Bertrand Russell styles the will as a separable faculty, "A metaphysical superstition." With some the ductless glands take over the role usually assigned to the will. Dorsey says that the adrenal glands put us on a war footing. When we are confronted by an emergency, the medulla adrenal gland pours adrenin into the blood and prepares us for combat. This is the brain that takes charge of us when we are confronted by emergencies that mean life or death. Thus we see that the will as the determining, dynamic power of the ego is gone. This is a most revolutionary change in psychology.

Finally I would note the varied treatment of the moral sanctions. The older idea was that there is a realm of moral ideas with peculiar rights and canons that could not be reduced to the categories of utility, happiness or to any other naturalistic level. There was a special faculty of the personality that apprehended these moral elements and made its verdict in every case of moral decision. But the day of the moral imperative also seems to be gone. Intuitive ethics must give way to the new experimental ethics of behaviorism, that accepts no moral principles as sacred, but must work out each situation according to the stimulus-response formula. As Dorsey contends in *Why We Behave Like Human Beings*, our conduct is conditioned by our reaction systems. The situation we are in dominates us and releases a powerful habit system—whether it be manual, laryngeal or visceral. A cross-section of our habit system in these three fields gives us a picture of our personality. Now I am not pausing for any criticism here, but merely outlining the diverse treatments of the old psychological problems by the new psychologies.

III.

In the third place, I would note the importance of this matter of personality or mechanism in religious education. Modern theories of religious education are predicated on certain well defined premises. One of these is the reality of personality. The whole goal of modern religious education goes on the assumption that there is an ego to be reached, that it functions in the divers aspects of intellect, emotion, will and conscience, and that thru mental and spiritual appeals there can be a genuine training in character and service. The excellent programs of religious education are all predicated on the above positions.

There is the informational aspect of moral training. The aim of this feature of the work is to impart certain historical, theological and moral truths to the individual. These truths are given, not to be indulged in as idle information, but that thru them the emotions and the will may be turned in the direction of right actions and a proper adjustment may be made not only to the physical, but also to the spiritual environment in which we live. But this elaborate informational program demands the existence of an ego and the fact of consciousness. Remove both of these elements from psychic life, as behaviorism attempts to do, and there will be no avenue of approach thru which real information may be imparted.

Then there is the training of the devotional life of the child. This is really a proper culture of the religious emotions. How vital this is in the various departments of Sunday School work! How important it is that the proper songs should be sung in the various departments, suitable scripture read, and that, in general, the devotional train-

ing should be sound and sane and graduated to the psychic needs of the child. Because the tender plant of young religious devotion has not been properly nurtured, but has been brusquely and even brutally cultured, the result has been that in later years the adult flower of religious life is either dwarfed and stunted, or else has run wild in the direction of some moral monstrosity or spiritual fanaticism. But this wonderful training of the flower of reverence is based on certain basic assumptions. One is the existence of a functional side of the personality that we style the emotions. If we adopt the definition of J. B. Watson that the emotions are only certain conditioned pattern reactions, involving profound changes in the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems, then there will be no room left for the education of the child's devotional life. Another premise is the mystical reality of religion. All training in worship is predicated on the assumed reality of the object worshipped. But suppose, as much modern psychology of religion holds, there is no objective reality corresponding to the object of worship, God, but that the devotional response is only subjective and due to an arousing of the cranial, sympathetic, or sacral systems. I think that, if this view is true, all training in devotion will stop over night. I credit the human race, both juvenile and adult, with too much hard common sense to sit hour after hour in song, prayer and meditation to a God that has no objective reality but is only a creation and projection outward of the autonomic nervous system. The human family will not waste those precious hours in a sort of moral and spiritual soliloquy.

Finally there is the training in the volitional life of the child. Every impression must lead to some expression.

Every wise teacher will see to it that all informational training and all emotional culture will converge in the one direction of shaping the will for service, and for a proper adjustment to the social, moral and spiritual environment. This training for service rests on certain well-defined foundations. One is the reality and potency of ideals. Now an ideal differs from the adjustments to environment of the mechanistic psychologists in that it is more than a present response to a stimulus with the attending satisfaction that ensues; and, further, in that it involves a moral background that is different from mere utility or mere sense satisfaction. There is an element of futurity in an ideal that leads it beyond all momentary sensual adjustments to environment. There is a moral oughtness about it that defies any reduction to the lower categories of mechanism. But if the will is dispensed with entirely, if man is only an automaton and if all psychology can be reduced to the stimulus-response equation, then all training for service, all reaching of the will thru the imparting of religious ideals, will vanish forever. Thus we see that the brand of psychology which we adopt will determine what methods of religious education we will use. As Squires well says in his *Psychological Foundations of Religious Education*, "The mechanistic explanation will lead to a religious pedagogy which has the establishment of desirable nervous reflexes as its goal. The purposive explanation will lead to a religious pedagogy which has the building of right ideals as its goal. Differing as to their goals, the two systems will differ as to their methods. The mechanistic pedagogy will stress activity, but give small place to the information of the intellect or the culture of the emotions. It will do this because actions will establish desirable brain paths, whereas

intelligence and emotions belong to consciousness and consciousness is impotent; therefore, why cultivate it?"

IV

Finally, I would note the import to the preacher of the various platforms in psychology. The church thru its preaching ministry has a certain well-defined program. It goes on the assumption that the present life of sense, mere stimulus and response, is not the whole story of reality. It holds that there is something more, and that this "Plus" is an abiding ego. It contends further that there is a moral and spiritual universe with certain sanctions and laws that cannot be reduced to utility, to mere hedonism or to mechanical categories. The soul of man is out of tune with its spiritual environment, and needs an adjustment. That adjustment the church would mediate thru the preaching appeal which is directed primarily to the mind and will of man. After the soul of man has been reached, then he must be trained in service and in character. Such, in psychological terms, is the program of the church. If man is not a purposive being but only a nervous automaton, if the old faculties of mind, emotion and will disappear, if all of psychology is found in the stimulus-response equation, then the whole preaching program of the church is built on sinking sand. Adoption of the standpoint of behaviorism would demolish the preaching ministry of the church even more than her program of religious education. The stimulus-response equation leaves us no moral sanction, no ideals and furthermore, it makes impossible any moral or spiritual appeal to the mind and will. There is neither mind nor consciousness to attend to sermons.

Surely, of all the bootless and fruitless undertakings under the canopy of heaven, the most foolish I could possibly imagine would be for a poor preacher of the Gospel to spend one hour of inspiration and perspiration trying to make a spiritual appeal to a large crowd of nervous automata who lacked not only minds that could be reached but also consciousness to attend to his choice rhetoric, and who even if they could heed one word, could not possibly make a single change in their mechanically predetermined lives. If the mechanistic psychology prevails, then all preaching will go, and it ought to go as soon as possible. Let us turn our churches to better uses. Let us make them hospitals where the principles of the new psychology may be applied. Of course, there will be no use in trying to train the mind along religious lines, for both mind and consciousness have gone by the board. But there may be a sort of development of the emotional life thru training of the autonomic systems with attention to the cranial, sympathetic and sacral emotional organizations. For the training of the will the church may specialize on the endocrine glands—the glands of destiny. Courage may be fostered by giving attention to the adrenalin gland, and trying to get a proper co-ordination between the cortex or “little brain” of this important member and the medullary portion which pours adrenin into the blood. If there is an outpouring of adrenin from the medullary portion without arousing the cortex, then we have fear or terror. If the cortex adds its secretion the emotion changes to anger. If, in addition, the anterior pituitary adds its hormones, there is an added element of strength. Possibly the work of the church in the future will consist in a proper co-ordination of the glands of destiny. Or if she does not

do this, she may become psychiatrist, delve into the sub-conscious and unconscious minds and attempt to resolve the conflicts and restore inner harmony thru a wise use of the confessional and spiritual psycho-analysis. But whatever may be the future of the church, it must be patent to all that, if mind goes and consciousness is discarded with the vermiform appendix, and man is no longer a purposive being but an automaton, then any attempt to save thru preaching a soul, which does not exist, is vain. Any effort by spiritual means to shape a character to higher ends is bootless, if there is no such a thing as character or even morality in the common acceptance of the term, and if man is only an organism or nervous system absolutely predetermined by the stimulus-response equation.

V

Such is the issue before us. I do not think that I have exaggerated it one whit. What is going to be our response to this crisis in psychology? Shall we simply ignore the issue, and go on teaching and preaching in the same old way? In the meanwhile many of our young people are returning from college where they have studied psychology postulated on some of the diverse platforms I have outlined. Many of our adults read popular magazine articles that exploit behaviorism or Freudian psychology in popular terms, or they read the very readable books that are published on psychology and philosophy today. They go their way of thought; the church in utter self-complacency goes hers. In the meanwhile the hiatus between the two grows all the wider. Soon we read excited articles in the secular and religious press under such captions as,

"The waning influence of the church over young and old."

Shall we attempt to meet the issue by the old scholastic, metaphysical psychology of fifty years ago? Shall we combat John Watson by talking about, "The faculties of the soul, spiritual essences, modes and attributes and substances in general?" Shall we attempt to use the psychology and philosophy of Reid and Hamilton to combat the rising tide of mechanism? I would not say one word against these heroes of the psychologic faith. They fought the good fight in their day. They kept the faith of our fathers in their times. I am sure there is a crown of righteousness laid up for them in the philosophic hall of fame. But their nomenclature, their understanding of psychologic problems, their underlying philosophies, do not meet the issue today. We have to defend the same old psychologic realities that they so well preserved in their day. But times have changed. New problems are before us. New terms are demanded. New methods of approach are needed. We need to grapple once more in modern terms with the problem of personality. Is there any place for the ego in modern thought? Can we build up an argument for it that will meet modern conditions? To attempt to re-state the arguments for the soul will be the purpose of this book.

I will attempt to show that our twentieth century experience demands personality for its integration. I will not attempt to construct a subject doctrine in any academic, scholastic manner. I will try to re-discover the soul by certain attributes which it manifests here and now in man's psychic life. There are certain functions which the ego performs here and now which are absolutely essential to the integrity of man's experience and which only the sub-

ject can perform. One of the fundamental attributes of the ego is unity. Another is what the old thinkers called identity or a sense of responsibility for all our acts. A further mark of the ego is individuality. The categories which we shall use are not those of substance but of purpose. We shall try to reduce all our arguments to the categories of purpose. We do this because modern psychology, physics and biology are coming more and more to the purposive interpretation of life. The argument will be all the more successful if we meet science on a common ground, and not attempt to lead it up to some philosophic position which it rejects or ignores. Purpose is such a category. All the old attributes of personality may be classed under this rubric. There can be no real purpose in the individual if he has no unity, but is a mere mosaic of instincts or conditioned responses. There can be no purpose without a sense of identity or responsibility for all my acts. If I am a purposive being, they must be *my* acts, *my* experiences. It is I, all the while, that appropriates them from the stream of experience. There can be no place for purpose in psychology unless man is a real self. The sense of individuality is unique. It makes man more than his environment, more than the mere addition of his various habit or visceral systems of experience. How can I hew out my destiny unless I possess this unique, indefinable sense of difference? It is this sense of uniqueness, of difference that makes me a person. As Streeter well says, in his fine book, *Reality*, some minimum of individuality seems to be a necessary accompaniment of life. Life is not only an organizing principle but a principle of unity and individuation. The higher the life the richer the individuality. Standardization is for machinery and not for souls. In individuality

we attain a sense of quality. In properly interpreting experience the notion of quality as distinct from quantity must be introduced. Such is his position. Thus we see that all of the old "stock" characteristics of personality can, in the last analysis, be reduced to categories of purpose. In creating our personality doctrine we must not be hide-bound and dogmatic and intolerant of all modern thought, but must be sympathetic toward all real search for truth, and must realize that wherever we find genuine purpose, we are not far from the kingdom of God.

Such is the exploration on which we invite you to go. We trust that the journey will not be dry and scholastic, but will have much of zest and romance and charm about it. Surely there could be nothing more fascinating than a search for that most elusive, and yet most vital part of our being, that which we call personality. This is a vital question for all, even those who are not primarily interested in psychology. In contending for the reality of the ego, we are really fighting a battle for the defence of all spiritual values. If the personality cannot be maintained, then there is little use in trying to hold on to the other spiritual realities of religion and morality. Really the arguments both for and against the ego apply to all the other great truths of the spiritual universe. In defending the line of truth, we have selected not only the most strategic, but perhaps the easiest, sector of all to hold. We can have a more immediate knowledge of personality than of any other spiritual reality. This truth is more susceptible of scientific verification. Above all, it is the part of the sector around which the most bitter fighting is taking place. An apologist today who spends his time trying to defend the line that guards baptism, or even the incarnation or the in-

spiration of the Bible, is not acquainted with the trends of modern thought. The real battle is over the very existence of any spiritual realities at all, over whether there is any such thing as rightness or goodness or oughtness. The central battle of all is over the question of personality. If we can establish purpose in man, then it will not be much trouble to prove that there is a divine purpose behind the universe, and to lead on to a defence of miracles, inspiration, the incarnation, etc. If behind the nervous system and endocrine glands, there is no soul or abiding purpose in man, then it is bootless to search back of the great cosmic processes for a creative and directing purpose in the universe. If the ideals of purpose do not count and impinge on conduct, it is useless to try to show that the cosmic soul has a world purpose, or Providence, or that He acts directly on the world in miracles. If all the personality we have is a mere cross-section of conditioned reflexes, or a number of systems of visceral organizations that sooner or later go back to the dust, then the doctrines of God, freedom and immortality are in jeopardy.

Is it purpose or mechanism? That is the question. The answer will determine, not only our moral and religious life here and now, but our interpretation of the great historic facts of the past. Last summer with an old Trappist monk I wandered thru the Catacomb of St. Callistus at Rome. It was a memorable and never-to-be-forgotten experience. As I passed thru those old underground chambers, where the Christians were wont to meet for worship and prayer, I saw the marks of those heroic days on the walls—the fish, symbol of the deity of our Lord, the anchor of hope, the peacock, emblem of the Resurrection, the names of those buried “in pace.” The thrill of those

early days came to me. I could imagine a meeting of the Christians who had been assembled together by the sign of the fish. They sing their songs; they eat the communion together; they have their love feast. Religion and worship meant something in those days. They lived apart from the world. They were in close commerce with God and the spiritual world. It meant something in those days to be a Christian. At any moment there might be a fatal interruption. The Roman Legions would be upon them. That meant the arena and the lions and a martyr's death. My leaving of our modern world with its mechanism and naturalism and objectivism, and dipping down into the earth to a period when men really believed in spiritual realities in themselves and in the universe about them—and staked their lives on the power of those realities—I say, this was an inspiring experience. I came back from my pilgrimage a firmer believer in my own soul, in God and in the spiritual realities of our religion. That this intellectual exploration may bring you into a closer fellowship with your own personality and into a more vital commerce with the realities of the moral universe, is the wish of the author.

CHAPTER II

SOME OF THE OBSTACLES



THE modern atmosphere of thought is not salubrious to a favorable consideration of the doctrine of personality. Mental climates have a great deal to do in the rendering easy or difficult the acceptance of a certain tenet. The psychic atmosphere of seventy-five years ago was decidedly different from that of today; it was decidedly favorable to an acceptance of the belief in personality. Then the very foundation stone of all thinking was the reality of the soul, the sanctity of its tenets and categories, and its ability to interact with the objective world about it. Over against the subjective world and its laws, which were accepted as axiomatic, was the objective sphere of brute material phenomena. There was a dualism between the two. The laws of the spirit applied to the inner world, where the dominant notes were purpose and free will. The laws of causation applied to the outer world, whose chief note was determinism. The problem then was not to prove the reality and necessity of a person, or to show that personal categories can have any influence in the world of matter. No; the great issue then was to find out how to bridge the chasm between the world of spirit and the world of matter; to show how the categories of thought could be applied to brute things; and to be certain that man could ever have any real first-hand knowledge of objective reality and not contact with a mere copy. The fact of personality was seldom called in question. If any thing was called into question, it was the reality and independent existence of the objective world. The supreme court in all matters was the

testimony of consciousness. Idealist, materialist, and common-sense realist alike brought their decisions to the bar of this court of last resort. In most cases the statutes under which a case was tried were supplied by common sense. It is needless for me to state that the modern world does not live in this mental atmosphere. The very foundation principles of thinking have changed. The methods of approach are different. Above all, the very fact that was once accepted as almost axiomatic, the existence of personality, is now called in question. I would have you note some of the more modern objections to this doctrine.

I

At the outset I would note the objection that personality is supernatural. If there is one term that is anathema to the modern mind, it is the word "supernatural." Like a valiant crusader current thought has sallied forth to banish that expression from all forms of discussion. I spoke in the first of this chapter of the presuppositions of the mind of seventy-five years ago. They were the reality of the ego, and the sanctity of its categories of thought and conduct. The problem then was how to bridge the chasm between the subjective and the objective worlds. The mental outlook today is entirely different. The modern mind starts with the presupposition of the uniformity of natural law. Naturalism is the bed rock foundation. There is no problem of a dualism between the worlds of spirit and matter, for all belongs to the sphere of the objective. The problem now is not to bridge a dualism—for that no longer exists—but to spread the tenets of the Gospel of naturalism, so that eventually all departments of human endeavour—

science, philosophy, psychology and religion—will be brought under the sway of natural law. The basic truths today are the unity and continuity of all experience. There must be no dualism, no hiatus anywhere. The reign of naturalism must be made supreme.

Now, it must be evident to all that with such a mental atmosphere, there is not only an unfavorable consideration given to the doctrine of personality, but decided opposition is aroused against it. The modern mind would say to our defender of the doctrine of personality, "We have no place in our scheme of things, based on natural law and the continuity of experience, for so mysterious and ghost-like a doctrine as that of personality. We cannot accept the tenet that a person with purposes, thoughts, ideals, and moral sanctions that are entirely different from naturalism, can exist. Even if there is such a mystical and magical realm of ideals and purposes and ethical imperatives, we cannot see how they can ever interact on the world of nerve and muscle and the objective order in general. To accept such an interaction would do violence to our whole tenet of the uniformity of natural law. It would introduce that very hiatus and dualism into experience that we have been labouring all our lives to destroy. The very notion of personality smacks of ghosts and fairies, and is utterly alien to our modern way of looking at things." Such is the answer of our modern mind to the protagonist of personality. Perhaps the crux of the whole matter is the problem of interaction. The modern world does not object so much to the existence of a spiritual world, with its laws, ideals and imperatives, as long as that world remains apart from the objective order—a sort of passive spectator, an epiphenomenon, a steam whistle

to the train of existence. But it cannot bear the idea of the subjective world with its laws interacting and changing experience. The problem of interaction has ever been the greatest question before psychology. Especially is it true that, for the intellectualist psychology of the past century, which reduced all the faculties of the soul to mere ideas, the problem of interaction was very acute. How could a mere idea produce action of any kind in the nerves, muscles or outer world in general? The impossibility of securing any plausible theory of action undoubtedly helped to demolish the old idea psychology. The dynamic psychology arose as a protest against the intellectualist interpretation of psychology, and as a more plausible attempt to give a theory of action and interaction. Undoubtedly it is more successful than the old idea psychology. The drives of instinct, the unconscious or systems of habit in this later psychology can come closer to explaining action than the mere presence of an idea in the mind. It is the problem of interaction with its violent threat to the unity, continuity and uniformity of experience that is especially repulsive to modern thought. This opposition has had much to do with the skepticism regarding personality as a real factor in experience.

Modern science tells us that its objective has been to dispel forever all personal causes from the natural order. There was a time when personal causation, the supernatural and the miraculous ruled in the forerunner of modern chemistry, and we had alchemy. The presence of the personal and the supernatural where they did not belong ruined it as a science. Gradually modern thought has banished these supernatural, magical, personal factors and brought all chemical phenomena under the absolute reign

of natural law. This, and only this, is true science. Long ago personal and magical forces were supposed to reign among the heavenly bodies. These personal causes enabled us to foretell the future by studying the stars. That was astrology, the forerunner of modern astronomy. But gradually the magical, the mystical and the personal have been dispelled from this pseudo science, and now the world has the most exact science of astronomy. The modern mind claims that the same great revolution took place in biology when the doctrines of special creation, and the miraculous were banished, and in their place were put the notions of natural selection thru a survival of the fittest, the theory of mutations or some form of emergent evolution. But the whole point is, that the world could not have true science until all personal, magical and supernatural factors were banished, and all was turned over to the uniformity of law. Imagine what would happen to the science of chemistry if miracles were the order of the day. The presence of the miraculous and supernatural in the chemical laboratory would surely break up many a daily experimentation—perhaps to the delight of the student.

Now the great deliverance from personal and magical factors in other sciences had sooner or later to be attempted in psychology. Why not get rid of all such mystical and magical notions as a personality and supernatural interactions in experience? Why not make it a pure science, free from all personal and miraculous factors? So argues our modern thinker. John Watson says that all psychologies but his own have a religious background. They are based on the idea of the soul. The idea of the soul originated on account of the general laziness of mankind, he contends. Man sees some unusual phenomenon. Now it

would take hard work and study to investigate in a painstaking manner this occurrence and reduce it to natural law. It is so much easier to avoid this work and to decide that miraculous forces caused it, and to argue that behind all phenomena is a supposed soul like the observer's. Soon there would arise a certain class like medicine men and priests who would persist in giving a personal explanation of all phenomena, and would specialize in arousing the fears and superstitions of the masses in this manner. Hence there arose such terms as sin, the devil and the miraculous. Now the object of modern thought is to banish all these purely personal explanations of experience from psychology, as well as from all other sciences. Of course, in psychology these crusaders meet a more determined defence of the reality of the ego, of the sanctity of its laws and of its ability to control experience in a purposive way. But the spirited opposition must not deter the scientist from his task of banishing the personal, the magical, the mystical and all traces of interaction from psychology.

II

The second objection to the doctrine of personality is that it is not scientific. The magical word today is "scientific." All theories must be able to be tested out in the laboratory. How is psychology going to meet this test? It is easy enough for science to deal with the afferent and efferent nervous systems, with the striped and unstriped muscles, with the various endocrine glands and the mysterious secretions of these ductless glands, the hormones, the messengers of destiny that are poured directly into the blood. It is easy enough for the laboratory to carry out in-

telligence tests and to give us the intelligence quotient—the mental age divided by the real age of the person examined. So far, so good! But how will the scientist examine the ego in the laboratory? How can he make any laboratory report on my purposes, aims, ideals, my moral sanctions, my secret thoughts? These defy scientific analysis. If the subject and all of these personal factors defy modern scientific investigation, why not cut the Gordian knot by banishing them forever from the sphere of scientific psychology? Let us even go further, and get away from consciousness altogether. Let us study not thoughts, but actions. Well, that is the very revolution in psychology that modern behaviorism is attempting to effect. The fundamental notion is the unconditioned stimulus (U.) S. leading to the unconditioned response (U.) R., which is represented by the following simple formula, (U.) S.—(U.) R. This is the native, untrained response of the organism to certain stimuli. For example, such a stimulus as the tapping of the tendon below the knee will lead to a kickup of the leg, or the stimulus of light will cause a closing of the pupil or a turning of the eyes. Now either the unconditioned stimulus, or the unconditioned response, or both can be trained or conditioned. This takes place in the hurly-burly of experience or thru deliberate education. Then there is a substitution of the conditioned stimulus or response for the unconditioned. A conditioned stimulus (C.) S. leads to a conditioned response (C.) R. This is represented by the equation, (C.) S.—(C.) R. As John Watson says in his *Behaviorism* (page 22f), “Experiment teaches us as is shown in the above table that a drop of acid in the mouth will from birth produce a flow of saliva. This is an example of a native or unconditioned

stimulus. The sight of the smoking-hot cherry pie that causes the salivary glands to flow so fully is an example of a conditioned visual stimulus. The sound of the gentle footsteps of the mother that stops the crying of her child is an example of a conditioned auditory stimulus." Then, as he shows, we can substitute conditioned responses. Yesterday the sight of the puppy (U.) S. called out from the child the following unconditioned response (U.) R.—fondling, pet words, play and laughter. Today the same sight of the dog (U.) S. calls out the following reaction—screaming, withdrawal of the body. Something has happened. Late yesterday the dog bit him too hard in play, broke the skin and caused bleeding. This new stimulus led to the new response—withdrawal of body, screaming. When the child again sees the dog, the sight arouses not the first unconditioned response but this latter response. Hence this conditioned response (C.) R. is substituted for the first natural reaction (U.) R. of fondling, pet words, etc. The behaviorist claims that our education—mental, emotional and manual—consists in substituting conditioned stimuli and responses for the unconditioned. Thus all psychology is reduced to these simple equations. A mathematical formula takes the place of the soul.

Let us see how our magical formula would work in the case of the emotions. At birth there are three sets of emotional responses that can be called out by three different sets of stimuli. These responses are fear, rage and love. Loud noises and loss of support will call out fear in the baby. A hampering of the bodily movements will bring out rage. A stroking and patting of the skin, and especially the erogenous zones will arouse the emotion of love. These are the nuclei out of which all future emotional re-

actions arise. All of this corresponds to our first equation, (U.) S.—(U.) R. Then the substitute stimulus is brought in and our unconditioned stimuli and unconditioned responses are changed to conditioned stimuli and conditioned responses. Thus, the infant has a negative response to a white rat. But if, at the same time the rat is presented a loud noise is made, the reaction of fear will be exhibited. If this is repeated, soon the mere sight of the white rat will cause fear. John Watson claims that most of our fears are unnatural and produced by substitute stimuli and conditioned responses, as indicated above. Thus we have our second equation, (C.) S.—(C.) R. Thus man builds up his complicated emotional pattern reactions. All of his emotional life, in fact all psychic life in general, can be explained in this way.

Such is psychology by equation. It is simple enough—so simple, in fact, that like all over-simplicities, all mental short-cuts, I am afraid that it has ignored some of the basic facts of psychic life. Really behaviorism is nothing but a revamping of the old psychological attempt to explain all mental life by the laws of the association of ideas. The behaviorist does not believe in ideas or consciousness. So I would say that it is a theory that would explain all psychic life without recourse to a personality or even to consciousness but thru the simple laws of association of movements. Thorndyke, in his theory of learning thru chance movements, states the fundamental laws of effect or satisfaction and discomfort and exercise. Thus, in his *Education* (page 96) he writes, "The law of effect is that, other things being equal, the greater the satisfyingness of the state of affairs which accompanies or follows a given response to a certain situation, the more likely that response is to be made to

that situation in the future." Now these laws, while differently phrased, seem to be nothing more than the laws of contiguity in time or place, similarity and contrast, and emotional congruity, laws long ago formulated by the old associationists. The fact is, satisfaction is a conscious, and thus a personal response. Thorndyke's theory demands the existence of personality. The old theory of association of ideas played out as a sole method of interpreting psychic life. It failed because it ignored personality as a vital factor in experience. It remains to be seen whether the new theory of association of movements will not also go into discard, as have so many tenets that ignored personality.

Before leaving the objection that the doctrine of personality is not scientific, I would say a word about the celebrated body-mind problem. Of course, I have been dealing with this problem all along under different terms. The modern thinker feels competent to interpret any series of data as long as they belong to one order of causal sequences. That plane is the material. Thus he can explain that rage is due to a hampering of the bodily movements, or the emotion of love to a stroking of certain parts of the body. Courage is caused by certain secretions of the adrenal gland. This explanation of psychic phenomena is simple enough, for it moves entirely within the range of material sequences. But when you ask the modern thinker how a spiritual soul can influence and direct a material body, he is utterly at sea. A soul belongs to one order, and a body to another—and never the twain shall meet. The modern mind has no satisfactory theory as to how a spiritual subject can frame its own conclusions as to patriotism, decide to go to war, manifest the attitude of courage, and all the while cause these wholly spiritual con-

clusions to influence and direct the body. As I have shown, modern thought has its own theories of love and hate, and succeeds in keeping these explanations within material sequences. But when you talk of a self in the light of conscious processes and conclusions manifesting an attitude of love, and of this purely spiritual experience reacting on the body, then the modern scientific spirit is utterly non-plussed.

III

The third modern objection to the doctrine of personality is that it violates the flow of the stream of consciousness. I have defined personality as an entity that has unity, identity and individuality. Modern thought replies that it knows no static unity, no fixed identity, no settled point of individuality in its experience. Experience knows no mathematical unities, no irreducible minimums. William James spoke of the stream of consciousness. John Watson speaks of the stream of movement. All agree that there is nothing fixed, static or settled about experience. It is dynamic; it is fluid.

Now our normal experience would seem to violate this notion of the unity and identity of the self. Life is featured by a growing complexity, by the continual acquisition of new knowledge, by the possession of new experiences. This continual growth of experience and of personality is what imparts zest and enthusiasm to life. I am not the same unit, the same fixed mathematical identity today that I was a year ago. I have bought a new car—with all of the financial and mechanical thrills and heartaches that go with such a venture. I have fallen in love—

with all of the new fields of romance, poetry and self-sacrifice that are opened up by this experience. I have taken a trip to Europe. My store of knowledge has been increased. Many of my old prejudices, my narrow provincialisms, my bitter hatreds have been destroyed. I feel that I am a new man with new acquisitions, new mental and spiritual assets. And now do you mean to tell me that I have not grown and expanded in a year? Am I the same static center of existence, the same logical point of identity now in spite of my wonderful experiences—their thrills, acquisitions and expansions—that I was a year ago?

Thus the modern man rebels at this static view of personality. He is in doubt about its having the attributes of fixed unity and logical identity of which we have spoken. Such a unity and identity of the soul would paralyze all efforts at growth, would kill all enthusiasm for expansion, and would nullify all attempts at true education.

Even religion itself is opposed to this static, fixed view of personality. It has its doctrine of conversion, which would seem to teach a rather radical and revolutionary twist and change in the identity and unity of the ego. It has its theory of sanctification or growth in grace. These beliefs would militate against any doctrine of the static unity of the ego. It has its doctrines of religious education, which would essay to train the child for service thru a proper culture of the informational, devotional and expressional sides of life. Its whole program is postulated, not on a static, fixed subject, but on the possibility of change, growth and the taking on of new mental and spiritual acquisitions. St. Paul in Phil. 3:13-14 writes, "Brethren I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind—I press toward the

mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." It is a ringing call to get away from the static, fixed view of personality and to take on new moral acquisitions and spiritual attainments. But to insist that the ego is characterized by static fixedness and mathematical identity would seem to paralyze all effort and breed a moral opiate of self-satisfaction that would anaesthetize all his whole being. It would condemn Paul, as he describes his experience in verse 5, to walk ever on the treadmill of Pharisaic satisfaction with his circumcision, his Israelitish stock, his legalistic efforts and his own moral attainments. This static view of the ego would run counter to all of poetry's inspiration to growth. No longer could Oliver Wendell Holmes sing in the *Nautilus*,

Thanks for the heavenly message brought by thee,
Child of the wandering sea,
Cast from her lap, forlorn!
From thy dead lips a clearer note is born
Than ever Triton blew from wreathed horn!
While on mine ear it rings,
Through the deep caves of thought I hear a voice that sings,—
Build thee more stately mansions, O my soul,
As the swift seasons roll.
Leave thy low-vaulted past!
Let each new temple, nobler than the last,
Shut thee from heaven with a dome more vast,
'Til thou at length art free,
Leaving thine outgrown shell by life's unresting sea!

Another set of normal phenomena that militates against the supposed unity and continuity of the self is seen in the discontinuities of every day existence and in the apparent dependence of consciousness on the nervous system. What

happens to the unity and identity of the subject during the eight hours of sleep which most of us enjoy every day? What disposition is made of the continuity and unity of the personality when the patient is under an anaesthetic and loses consciousness for several hours? What are we going to do with our unified spiritual monad when a hijacker hits our subject on the head and he loses consciousness for a long time? These normal breaks in consciousness, and the seeming dependence of awareness on the integrity of the nervous system, would seem to militate against any clear-cut, hard and fast definition of personality in terms of unity and identity.

I turn from these normal discontinuities of consciousness, to a brief consideration of certain data in abnormal psychology that likewise are ranged against the supposed unity and continuity of the self. It is only in recent years that these data have been given due consideration. Henry Sidgwick and Frederick W. H. Myers originated the movement that later expanded into the Society for Psychical Research. Its scope of inquiry included such themes as apparitions, hauntings, clairvoyance, clair-audience, rappings, mediumship and hypnotism. It soon became evident that the orthodox notion of a unified personality with a limited mental area would not explain these abnormal phenomena. Reid, in his essays on *The Intellectual Powers of the Mind*, has said, "The identity of a person is a perfect identity, wherever it is real it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same and in part different, because a person is a monad and is not divisible into parts." Now the very fact that Reid had pronounced to be impossible, i. e., that a person could not be in part the same and in part different, and that personality

admitted of no degrees, these investigators found to be true. The cases of dual and even multiple personality seemed to run counter to the supposed limited areas and hard and fast unity which Reid in an *apriori* manner had said were characteristic of the ego. What shall we do with the case of Mary Reynolds on Reid's theory of a unified monad? Here was a young lady, the daughter of a Pennsylvania pioneer, who was found in a deep sleep from which it was impossible to awake her. Awakening twenty hours later, she seemed as a newborn child. Memory and all the acquisitions of past experience and education were gone. After five weeks she awoke to her former self without any memory of the events of the interim. A few weeks more and she relapsed into a secondary state. Thus she alternated in personality until the age of thirty-five, when she remained her secondary self.

Or take the case of Félicité of Bordeaux. She would go into a trance from which she would emerge with different characteristics. The secondary personality was an improvement over the primary, which was melancholy, fretful and taciturn. In her secondary state she had a clear memory of both states, while in her normal condition she knew nothing of the happenings of the secondary state. Finally the secondary personality gained the ascendancy over the primary, and there emerged a new woman.

How shall we explain a case of alternating personality like this on Reid's theory of a unified ego, a simple monad, with hard and fast boundaries that defied expansion? Then there was the case of Madam B. In her normal state she was timid, dull and uneducated. When hypnotized she became vivacious, bright and quick witted. When cast into a deeper state of hypnosis, a third personality ap-

peared with higher qualities than the other two. How shall we explain these abnormal cases? Myers propounded the theory that the personality is at once extremely complex and profoundly unitary. He expanded and deepened its psychic boundaries. He even opened up a cellar under it that he called the subliminal mind. It becomes evident that the mind is not as unified, as limited in mental area as earlier thinkers had thought. Later thinkers, like Jung and Freud, have opened up a closed cellar beneath the subliminal which they call the unconscious. They have even tried to explain all mental life by the repression in this unconscious, the monkey wrenches that have been thrown into the mental machinery that have deranged the harmonious workings of the psychic organism. An Englishman, W. H. R. Rivers, has done excellent work in the mechanism and significance of repression. Even those writers who reject the fact of the unconscious as magical and mystical, yet make use of the same factors under different terms. Valentine, who rejects the mystical view of the unconscious, speaks of the low level of thinking based on the faint linkages across the cortical neurones. Such is the fate that has befallen the simple, unitary monad of Reid's day. It has been expanded, deepened and amplified in various and sundry directions. It has been found that the ego has a complexity and an expansiveness of which the earlier philosophers hardly dreamed.

IV

The final objection to a consideration of the doctrine of personality in modern psychology is that this treatment would cause us to import philosophy and even theology

into an otherwise pure science. The modern thinker reminds us that during the middle ages the areas of science, philosophy and theology were practically merged, and all were under the ministering care of the Church. The fields of inquiry, canons, rights and various categories of the three were practically interchangeable. As a result, much confusion resulted. Free scientific inquiry, untrammelled by theological and ecclesiastical restrictions, was impossible. Much confusion, superstition and obscurantism resulted. Then came the glad day when science and philosophy cast aside their ecclesiastical swaddling clothes, and asserted their freedom. They could use their own canons, their own categories, and could now be inspired by only one passion—the desire for the truth at any price. This delimitation of the special fields of science, philosophy and theology has been most valuable, not only for science, but also for the other two. Each study has been given its own field of inquiry, its own peculiar problems, its own unique canons and categories. This division of the field of thought has been helpful to modern apologetics. It has relieved it of many embarrassing problems and supposed religious dilemmas that vanish at once when the above delimitations of the fields of inquiry are noted. Science is to deal with a description of objective sequences, is to make use of the principle of causality. Philosophy takes up the problems of final causes and questions of knowledge and being that science cannot solve and passes on to a higher court. It makes use of the principle of rationality. Theology considers problems of origins, purpose in the universe and redemption which pure reason cannot solve and which demand a revelation. It makes use of the canon of personality. Such is the illuminating division of the fields of labour

that the best thought of the hour in science, philosophy and theology is following.

Students of psychology tell us that, according to this delimitation of the fields of inquiry, the question of personality belongs not to pure science, but to philosophy, and it may be to theology. To insist that the psychologists should take a stand on personality is to break down the illuminating divisions I have noted, and to attempt to merge all three into a common mental "hodgepodge" of investigation, as was done in the middle ages. This would mean a reversion to superstition and obscurantism. Hence I find that most modern psychologists do not believe that the problem of personality should be dealt with in their science. It is a matter for philosophy. Do not try to lug it with its alien categories of purpose, unity and identity into an otherwise pure science. The belief in personality is not needed today. If a rational science can be constructed on the basis of the functioning of the nervous system, the ductless glands of destiny, the simple stimulus—response equation, or the dynamics of the unconscious or the driving power of the instincts, then why insist on bringing in the useless hypothesis of a person. If the science of psychology can be made rational without it, then the law of parsimony would demand that the whole notion of personality be dropped or be referred to the fields of philosophy and theology. I find among some Christian psychologists, who undoubtedly hold to some theory of personality, a little impatience with Christian thinkers because they insist that psychology should settle one way or the other with the vital question of personality.

Such are the various objections of the modern mind to the doctrine of personality. I have tried to state them in

a fair manner. They are most real to our modern mind. Are these objections valid? Are they an insuperable obstacle to a belief in personality?

If these modern positions hold, then Omar is right and

We are not other than a moving row
Of magic shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illumined lantern held
In midnight by the Master of the show;

But helpless pieces of the game He plays
Upon this chequer-board of nights and days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks and slays,
And one by one back in the closet lays.

Is all consciousness of purpose a delusion and a chimera?
Is Ella Wheeler Wilcox wrong when she sings in *The Winds of Fate*:

One ship drives east and another drives west,
With the selfsame winds that blow,
'Tis the set of the sails
And not the gales
That tell them the way to go.

Like the winds of the sea are the winds of fate,
As we voyage along thru life,
'Tis the set of the soul
That decides its goal
And not the calm or the strife.

In Matthew 6:25 the Master asks this historic question that comes ringing down the centuries to challenge our modern mind: "Is not the life more than meat, and the

body than raiment?" Here the Master definitely asserts the primacy of the spiritual in man. He bases on this fact His doctrine that the thought and emotional attitudes of worry or equanimity which we as purposive beings adopt are important and determinative of conduct. He definitely states that life is more than a mere physical response to the stimulus of bodily and sensual needs. He calls on man as a determiner of his own destiny to assume a definite will attitude to the Kingdom of God. He assures him that this vital decision will help to settle all his lesser problems. It is a most beautiful philosophy of living which the Master constructs on His initial question. Shall the modern mind say "No" to this historic question, and demolish like a house of cards the beautiful philosophy of idealism which is built upon it?

CHAPTER III

SOLVING THE HUMAN EQUATION



IN THIS chapter I will present some of the arguments for belief in personality. Some of these will be indirect and presumptive, and others direct proofs of the doctrine. The general substance of the argument will be that there are certain indubitable factors in experience that cannot properly be interpreted, explained and integrated without belief in the reality of the ego. Let us see if the riddle of personality can be solved.

I

I would present certain every-day experiences of the race that point to personality. Many traditions of the plain man are today rejected as naive and uncritical. I maintain that there is much value in these age-long tenets of mankind. They cannot all be wrong. Else why have they persisted thru all these years, and why have they exercised such a marked influence on the course of history? The old Latin phrase, *Communis consensus hominum*, still has value. According to the pragmatic test, these traditions of the common man are still with us; they have worked in the past, and are still functioning in an efficient manner. Of course, I realize that there are limitations to these arguments from the common experiences of the race. They alone cannot be depended upon to establish the reality of the ego. But they at least have great presumptive value. They open up the way for the more critical arguments from psychology and philosophy.

In presenting these arguments, two great propositions are involved. One is the existence of certain factors in our common experience that belong to an order of reality above mechanism and have characteristics that are spiritual and personal. The other point is that these great values really count and function in the history of the race. By this last point I mean that there are certain personal elements in reality that interact on experience. I do not like that little word "interact." It smacks of the contempt of the naturalist for all that is personal and spiritual, and almost tacitly takes it for granted that there is only one order of existence, the purely natural, and that all other data—personal, aesthetic, religious—are magical and mystical and mere interlopers in the world of naturalism. When I say that certain ideas and spiritual ideals count in experience I mean that which is usually expressed by the term "interaction." I believe that I avoid the unsavory atmosphere which naturalism has generated about that term. My two points are, first, that certain factors exist that seem to demand the existence of personality, and, second, that these spiritual elements count in an efficient manner in the history of the race. If these vital factors and their causal efficiency in experience run counter to some of the pre-conceptions of modern thinkers, then the course for them to pursue is not to reject the plain demands of every-day experience, but to recast their scientific theories to fit the plain teachings of life. Facts must have the right of way over pre-conceptions and mere theories.

The first tradition of the race that points to personality is a sense of responsibility and identity in the individual. The race has always believed in this vital feeling of responsibility. When I awake tomorrow morning, after a good

night's sleep, I never doubt that I am the same individual that went to bed the night before. There are an intimacy, privacy, directness and warmth about my experience that are convincing, and that point to a continued sense of personal identity. On this assumption, that I am not Bill or John, but my very own self I take up my duties where I left them off the night before. This sense of responsibility may be erroneous, but it has persisted all these years, and has played a most effective part in the history of the race. If it is wrong and a delusion, then all history must be re-written.

On this vital sense of responsibility, mankind has constructed its laws and erected its courts. If I am hauled up in court for speeding and brought before the police judge, I would hardly think of presenting my defence in this manner, "You have no right to fine me today for what happened yesterday. I am a mere stream of actions, and the stream has flowed so far and so much psychic water has gone over the dam since yesterday, that I am an entirely different person from the one who drove his car fifty miles an hour. Besides, the medullary portion of my adrenalin gland got too efficient yesterday, and discharged too many hormones into my blood and made me too active. Really I am not responsible." About the only answer to this plea of modern psychology would be the terse words, "Fifty dollars and costs."

In the next place, the race has always believed in the existence and potency of ideas. The common man still believes that the race thinks, and these thoughts play a vital part in the history of the world. He does not believe that all thinking is rationalization, or a mere attempt to hide his hidden reasons, motives and desires. He believes that great

ideas have existed in the past, and have been formative in the history of the race. He believes that Luther had a great idea, "The just shall live by faith," and that this concept changed the course of modern religious history. The average man remembers that Kaiser Wilhelm entertained the idea of German world power. This great notion, accepted for a time by a great people, overturned Europe and the world for four years, and changed the course of modern history. The average man remembers that Woodrow Wilson had the idea of a sound internationalism rather than the notion of a selfish nationalism. Today he sees that concept taking root in the world and bringing forth the noble fruits of world co-operation, universal peace and the outlawing of war.

Our common man still believes that thinking counts in the world of finance, business and politics. He believes that if there are great thoughts, there must be a thinker behind them. He is not much impressed by the new idea that thinking is subvocal talking, and that these great generative ideas of the past are merely laryngeal systems. He has known many a man who had a larynx which functioned perfectly, but who did not have very impressive ideas. He has known some other folks with a faulty larynx, who turned the world upside down with their mighty concepts. The average man still believes in the potency of thoughts; and, further, he believes that these ideas demand a personality and cannot be reduced to mere laryngeal systems. At least he elects to live in the world on that platform. He believes that, if he follows this hypothesis, he will in the end be successful.

Another great tradition of the race is the existence and potency of sentiments. A sentiment is a great system of

emotional reactions woven about a common object. Our emotional life gets organized into sentiments, just as our intellectual life does into ideas. The life of the race in the past has been wonderfully influenced by these great sentiments. Our home life has been constructed on the basis of parental and marital love. The great religious sentiments of the race have builded cathedrals, inspired missionaries to go into dark continents, and also caused the Church in intolerance to burn heretics at the stake. If you deny the efficiency of sentiments, you will have to rewrite a good part of religious history. Then think of what that sentiment we call patriotism has done in the past. One hot August day last year I journeyed out to the Arch of Triumph in Paris and climbed the weary steps up to the top. It is a most wonderful architectural triumph, 162 feet high and 147 feet wide. It is redolent with the glories and triumphs of Napoleon the First. Great martial scenes like the Marsellaise, by Rude, are carved on the sides of the arch. The names of the victories Napoleon won are cut in large letters, and the names of his generals in small letters. Under the Arch lies buried the Unknown Soldier of France. A gas flame burns incessantly, a testimony to the undying fires of patriotism in the human heart. As I stood there on the top of the Arch, with the fourteen streets radiating from this center, forming a mighty star, I was impressed with the potency of patriotism in the race and especially among the French people. Surely the great sentiment that we call patriotism has played a mighty part in the human drama. Is it merely an hereditary reaction pattern in the nervous system? Is it a pure product of the autonomic nervous system? The answer of the average mind is "No." Common sense insists that the great systems of sentiments,

whether parental, religious or patriotic, are predicated on the primal fact of personality.

Another acceptance of common sense is the existence and power of ideals. Ideals present proper and suitable ends for the will of man, just as sentiments represent his emotional systems. Shall life be turned in the direction of service or selfishness? Shall it be money or fame or public uplift? Shall it be mammon or Christ? Now the common mind insists that these valid ends of conduct exist for most men, and, moreover, that these ideals for the will really count in human experience. Morton Prince wrote in 1891, "But I do wish to emphasize the fact that any doctrine which ultimately leads to denial of volition as a cause of action is, as Mercier would say, 'nonsense,' and doomed to failure. If one is moved to sympathy at the misery of a beggar, and following one's sympathy one gives a dollar to that beggar, the giver is satisfied that his feelings of sympathy—his states of consciousness—directly controlled his muscular acts and moved his fingers to take a dollar bill out of his pocket and give it away." This is precisely the position of the average man. He believes that man can shape his destiny as a purposeful being, that there are certain great ends or ideals for man, and that these given ideals really count in experience. Of course, if ideals of conduct really exist and count in the hurly-burly of daily experience, then it can be only on the foundation of personality. Common sense refuses to believe that man is a mere nervous automaton.

A final tradition of the race to which I would call your attention is the testimony of consciousness. It has always been argued that our own consciousness testifies to the existence of an ego. In fact, one of the attributes of genuine

personality has been self-consciousness. This argument is not in very good repute in scientific circles today. Behaviorism rejects introspection entirely. I must not study myself, my own inner life, for these do not exist. I must study the conduct of the other fellow. Psychology is a purely objective sort of an affair.

The testimony of consciousness or introspection has played a large and vital part in the development of psychology in the past. Descartes, the father of modern thought, began with introspection when he said, "I think, therefore, I am." The influence of introspection has continued in one form or another down thru William James to our modern thinkers. Surely a doctrine so hoary and influential should not be cast aside at this late date in psychology in an off-hand manner. There must be something to the argument or it would not have persisted and changed human thought until this good day. In studying the testimony of consciousness to personality a certain care must be exercised. If I try to prove that my consciousness testifies directly to the existence of a unified spiritual substance that exists apart from the body and constantly interacts in a sort of miraculous manner, then this statement of the ancient belief is open to criticism. I do not know directly and immediately any such unified, identical spiritual monad. But I do find in my consciousness the attributes of personality—unity, purpose, responsibility—and, above all, I am conscious of certain elements in experience that can have no real meaning apart from personality. The testimony of consciousness is still valid, provided it is not carried too far, and made a witness to some highly speculative substance doctrine. Of course, the reaction against introspection is due to the fact that it is often uncritical,

and that the attempt is made to press it too far. The danger of introspection is the weakness of all subjectivism, whether in psychology or theology. It has no objective standards of measurement, it needs correctives from other sources, and hence it is often extravagant and uncritical. The course for modern psychology to pursue is not to discard introspection entirely, but to insist that it be corrected by recourse to the testimony of other people, and tested by objective standards. Private judgments and theories in all other sciences are thus corrected by being brought before the bar of the canons of the general science. My private theories and experiments must be brought to light, and subjected to the scrutiny and criticism of brother scientists. Why cannot introspection be saved for psychology in the same manner? Modern thought is suffering from a denial of the value of introspection. A sane use of this ancient method would rescue modern psychology from the perils of pure objectivism, and would give it the poise, sanity and a depth that are so much needed. A rational, critical study of the inner life is what modern thought needs above all else.

In the past the average mind has begun with a study and interpretation of its own inner life and reasoned outward from this to a construction and understanding of other individuals and objects. Modern thought reverses the process, and begins with a study of the actions of the other fellow, and of the external world, and reasons backward to the reality of its own mind. The conclusion of behaviorism is that consciousness does not exist. Now, to choose between the two extremes, I prefer introspection even with all its extravagances and naive assumptions. It at least has the benefit of a good past. The old doctrine has served

the race very well for several hundred years. The common man has not run into a blind alley as yet, by following the leadings of consciousness.

Such are some of the common traditions of the race that point to the doctrine of personality. They may not be conclusive arguments for the ego, but they should at least have great presumptive weight. I will now pass on to other lines of proof.

II

I would note arguments from psychology proper for the reality of the self. Can modern psychology get along without the doctrine of the soul? If so, then it should certainly be abandoned. We do not want any useless baggage carried along in the science. If unconditioned and conditioned reflexes and the endocrine glands of destiny will suffice to make experience rational, nothing more is needed. I take my stand on a proper interpretation and integration of experience. I partially agree on this point with John Dewey in his *Experience and Nature* (page 238). He holds that spiritual realities have no existence apart from their relation to experience. They are always of, from, toward situations and things. If the ego exists, it is a part and parcel of experience, and purely instrumental to an interpretation of this. It has no transcendental, supernatural function but it is purely a part of nature. I agree with Dewey that any doctrine that is to stand must be explanatory of experience. I take my stand, too, on experience in a construction of the ego doctrine. But whose experience? Shall it be the dwarfed, stunted experience of the naturalist? Or shall it be the rich, profound, expansive experience of

the believer in spiritual realities? If we are going to base our argument on experience, let us be sure that we are scientific enough to make our experience sufficiently broad and expansive to take in all the facts of life. The experience and the philosophy of Dewey are purely naturalistic. But he is ever and anon bringing in categories that are above nature. He believes in art. With its inter-connection of means and ends, it is the highest form of philosophy. But surely the categories of art are above nature. Beauty and the canons of art have ever been a rock of offence to the naturalist. Darwin's theory of evolution thru natural selection could never make any satisfactory explanation of why and how beauty ever existed in a world of brute force and utility. Why did art have survival value? Darwin tried by his theory of sexual selection to show how the most beautiful males were chosen by the females and their offspring thus survived. But this particular theory did not receive general acceptance. Now if Dewey introduces beauty into experience, he has brought in a category that is entirely alien to naturalism. If he can bring in art that is on a higher level than naturalism, then why not other levels of experience, such as the systems of ideas, ideals and moral sanctions that have played such an effective part in the history of the race? Yes, I take my stand on experience, but it is a full-orbed one that takes in all the facts of life, intellectual, moral and religious. I am trying to show that the only valid explanation, interpretation and integration of this full-orbed experience is to be found in the doctrine of personality. It takes the ego to make experience rational. I would now consider certain vital facts in man's psychic experience that are explicable only on the basis of personality.

The first of these is the sense of meaning. Of course, it is present in all acts of thinking. As James and Dewey have shown, this may be of various kinds. Reverie makes up a good part of our mental experience. This has been styled "Free Association." Then there is trial and error thinking. Dewey calls it routine thinking. There is intellectual activity that concerns the solving of a given problem. There is an obstruction in the way. This is creative, directive thinking, and consists largely in picking out of the given situation the relevant factor and comparing that factor with something else. Now all of these various types of thinking, as well as most of our conscious adjustments in daily living, involve this subtle sense of meaning. It is that relevancy to the situation, that sudden illumination that we have hit upon our given goal, that congruity between our given experiences and our real desires, and that pertinent point in a given psychic event that makes it satisfying to the mind, so satisfying, indeed, that we stop in our investigation of experience. That intuition in experience that finds, grips us and holds us is the sense of meaning. Many of our naturalistic philosophers claim that this sense of meaning, like personality itself, is mystical and ghost-like, and that we can dispense with it entirely. All we need is the adjustment of a given organism to its environment with its ensuing satisfaction, and the conditioned reflexes that are stored up for future use. Watson claims that the term "thinking" should cover up all word-behavior that goes on subvocally. The subvocal use of words has been completely habitized. How do we get new verbal creations like a poem? We get them by manipulating words until a new pattern it hit upon. There is no use for the word "meaning." As a substitute for this term,

Watson claims that we simply manipulate words until a new pattern is hit upon. But like many a modern thinker, he is sliding over and covering up the real problem by a dexterous use of words. The hitting upon the right pattern is just the very point of meaning at issue. How do we get it? I might have undertaken to write Hamlet's soliloquy, and manipulated and manipulated words until Gabriel blew his trump, but I never would have hit upon any literary creation that would have commanded the attention of the world. My vocal cords are all right, my visceral systems seem to be functioning normally, and my laryngeal habits are fine. On the other hand, Shakespeare manipulates words and hits upon a pattern that is so striking that most freshmen since his day have been memorizing that given pattern. What is the difference? The difference is that he put meaning and sense into his manipulation of the words while I could not. It all goes back to that subtle sense of meaning. This can be explained only on the basis of a personality that is not a blind spectator of the passing flux of experience, but that selects and picks out relevant materials, that can initiate its own standards of judgment and thus discriminate between truth and error. There must be this psychic initiative in thought, this ability to reach a goal, or else the distinction between truth and error will vanish. If you reject the sense of meaning, as naturalism does, then all thinking, all distinction between reality and falsehood, will go by the board. Hoernlé, in his *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, argues that even on the least speculative level of perception there must be meaning. We must transcend, synthesise, order and invest with meaning. He says discussing such a judgment as "This is a tree"—"For in all such judgments there is interpretation. A mean-

ing is affirmed of which pure preception ex hypothesi contains no trace" (page 122).

Another factor in experience that demands personality is the emotions. The explanation of the non-purposive psychologies is simple enough. All emotional life can be explained in terms of the sympathetic nervous system. Watson claims that there are three primary emotional responses—fear, rage and love. A loss of support and loud noises arouse fear in the infant. A hampering of the bodily movements stirs up rage. A stroking of the skin and erogenous zones elicits love. Out of these three primary emotions Watson would compound all of the emotional life of man. It all seems simple enough, but is it true? The weakness of many of our modern investigations of the emotions, as well as of other psychic data, is that they take place exclusively on the lower levels of experience and neglect the higher planes of life. John Watson seems to have spent most of his time investigating the life of infants. He has formulated his simple stimulus-response equation to explain their life. Wolfgang Koehler experiments with apes, and, as a result, he gives the world the gestalt psychology. Now these given theories of psychology are not entirely valid even on the levels of experience on which the investigations took place, and certainly they are very faulty explanations of the higher levels of human life. It is important to explain the psychic life of children and apes; but there are higher planes of experience that demand solution. It is precisely on the higher levels of life that such theories as those of Watson and Koehler break down.

A noble patriot like Edith Cavell dies in Brussels for her country and, in a sense, for humanity. Can we explain the emotion back of her sacrifice in terms of the sacral and

visceral systems? A missionary like Livingstone goes into the dark continent to spread the Gospel of Christ and a higher civilization. How shall we explain the emotion that impelled him to go and that held him true to his sublime mission? Can it be given exclusively in terms of the conditioned reflexes of behaviorism? Mary of Bethany breaks an alabaster box of ointment on the head of the Christ. It was a sacrifice of love. Its perfume has been wafted, as Christ predicted, all over the world. Can we explain that tender religious emotion in terms of the autonomic nervous system?

Now we all feel that there is a missing term in the problem. That absent note is the human equation. These naturalistic explanations equate the emotions with certain organizations of the visceral systems, and hold that certain secretions from the endocrine glands into the blood are the essential physiological conditions of the emotions. Undoubtedly these are contributing factors, but that the physiological changes are the emotions is debatable. Bertrand Russell, in his pungent book, *Philosophy* (page 218), rebuts this position most cogently. His argument is as follows: The adrenal glands secrete adrenin, which produces the bodily symptoms of fear and rage. On one occasion, he says, a dentist injected a considerable amount of this substance into his blood, in the course of administering a local anaesthetic. He turned pale and trembled and his heart beat violently; the bodily symptoms of fear were present, as the books said they should be, but it was quite obvious to him that he was not actually feeling fear. "I should have had the same bodily symptoms," he says, "in the presence of a tyrant about to condemn me to death, but there would have been something extra which was ab-

sent when I was in the dentist's chair. What was different was the cognitive part: I did not feel fear because I knew there was nothing to be afraid of." Yes, there is this "something extra," this cognitive part in most of our normal emotional life, and it points to personality and its reactions and attitudes. Let us take another case that brings out the necessity for the cognitive element, and the reaction of a personality to an object or given situation. I have watched the case of an adult with deficient thyroids, a case of myxedema. The patient was white, hairless, with thick, dry, rough skin. The temperature and metabolism were lowered. The pulse was slow and weak. The general emotional and mental life were sluggish. Then the patient took thyroid extracts. The change was marvelous. The skin, hair, metabolism and temperature soon became practically normal. The change in the emotional life was remarkable. There came a freshness, a vivacity, an optimism that were conspicuously absent before. The emotional life of the patient was "keyed up" and optimistic. There would have been about the same bodily symptoms of exhilaration if she had received a check from home for \$1,000—but there would have been something extra. What would have been different would have been the cognitive part. There would have been a new thrill here because there was something objective over which to be excited. Thus in most of our emotional life there is the cognitive side that points to personality.

These naturalistic explanations are satisfactory as far as they go, and are partly explicable of the levels of experience on which they were conducted. The emotional life of children, and the mental life of apes may be partially explained by their theories. But they fall down when applied to the

higher levels of experience. The emotional life, then, can be explained only on the background of personality. Patriots, missionaries and saints have their given emotions, not exclusively because their sympathetic systems and endocrine glands function in a certain way (although these factors may be contributing elements), but primarily because their personalities react in a certain way to certain questions of duty, right and other religious data. Woodworth has said that an emotion is "a stirred up state of the individual," and that it is an internal preparation for some type of overt action. I would substitute that an emotion is a stirred up state of the person. On the higher levels, especially, it can be explained as taking place only on a background of personality.

Another vital factor in experience that demands personality is the will. Even as recent a psychologist as William James has much to say about the various kinds of volitional life. Popular magazines and Chautauqua lecturers have had much to say about the development of a strong will, the conquering of bad habits and the building up of a victorious personality. But those days are gone in psychology. Very little is said now about the will as a separate faculty of the ego. We hear about the dynamic drives of life, the urge of the instincts and the unconscious. Psychic life is largely explained in terms of the stimulus-response equation. Purpose has been ruled out. Man has largely become a nervous automaton.

The question arises whether we can continue to get along without the will. Is it true that man reacts blindly to the stimuli that come to him from his environment? Is there no sense of purpose? Is he absolutely at the mercy of whatever stimuli happen to play upon his nervous system? Now

I do not believe that this deterministic view of life is true to the facts in the case. If this automaton theory of mechanical stimulation and response holds, then how did modern science ever arise? Here is man reacting passively to his environment? About him is an environment that consists of mosquitoes that bear malaria. There are deadly swamps that breed all kinds of bacteria that lead to typhoid fever, dysentery and other diseases. Is it a true picture of man to say that he continues to react mechanically to these deadly surroundings? Decidedly no! He goes forth with a definite purpose to overcome and change his insalubrious environment. He clears up the swamps. He screens himself against the mosquitoes, and sooner or later kills most of them. He discovers antitoxins and serums that can overcome most of these deadly diseases. This is the way that modern medical science has acted. If man had continued to respond blindly to stimuli, he would still be among the mosquitoes and the malaria.

Now does not this same picture apply to man in his daily experience? He does not passively acquiesce to the stimuli that impinge upon his organism. He does not attend in an indiscriminate manner to the entire stream of consciousness, but picks out certain stimuli for consideration. He is not at the mercy of his instincts and passions, but uproots some, sublimates others to nobler and higher ends, and harnesses others for a given purpose. His daily life is not entirely in terms of present satisfactions that ensue from a given adjustment. Elements of futurity enter into the situation. He is capable of formulating a goal, and hewing the line thru the maze of experience until he reaches that desired end. Hocking, in his *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (page 90), gives a fine interpretation

of the will-life of man. He holds that to have a stable policy is to have a will. He contends that the self might be described as a permanent principle of selection. Now consciously or subconsciously all of us sooner or later will formulate a settled policy of action. Will we yield to our passions, or sublimate them to higher ends? What course will we pursue throughout the maze of our surroundings? Are we going to yield passively to our environment? Or have we a given goal which we will pursue throughout life? Now the formulating of this given policy and the adhering to it largely constitutes our volitional life. Hickman, in his *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (page 60), holds that religion is an orientation to the Determiner of Destiny.

As I have shown above, no science could ever have arisen if man were a mere sport of chance, who was determined absolutely by the passing flow of events. A world of materialism with a blind dance of the electrons and protons would never have generated any science. It takes a will policy with ends, goals, the ability to initiate thought and to discriminate between truth and error, to erect any science. If naturalism alone accurately describes experience, I doubt very seriously if even the science of behaviorism could ever have risen. The behaviorist constantly speaks of his set experiments, of certain objects he has in view, and of certain goals that he must carry out. He is ever finding the meaning in his given observations, and changing his experiments to bring out new observations and meanings, and setting new goals in his investigations.

Now it is axiomatic that, if there is any real purpose and policy in man's psychic life, this demands a personality. There can be no real volitional life except on the back-

ground of personality. It takes a person to set goals, initiate thought, sublimate instincts, weed out others, to sally forth into the hurly-burly of life and blaze a path of purpose.

Finally, I would call your attention to the moral sanctions of life. These, too, must be rooted and grounded in personality. It has long been held that there are certain levels of experience, each with its own unique rights, categories and canons of judgment. Above the levels of material and intellectual data, there is the realm of art. It has its own peculiar laws and canons that can not be reduced to lower categories. In like manner there is the sphere of moral imperatives. These are unique, and hence could not be reduced to the categories of utility, happiness, or self-realization. These moral sanctions have their own peculiar rights and unique categories just as truly as does art or philosophy. They demand that they be judged before their own courts—and not before the bar of naturalism; by their own laws, and not by the canons of behaviorism.

The realm of morals, with its own rights, is being contested today. The attempt is being made to deny that it has any unique rights and categories and to level it down to the lowlands of expediency and naturalism. John Baillie, in the *Hibbert Journal*, writes on the New Hedonism, which modern realists like Durant Drake and Mantaque are attempting to erect. Happiness once more is being presented as the ground of all morals. Naturally this re-vamping of an old exploded moral theory fits in with this pleasure-loving age. Many people would like to feel today that happiness is true norm of conduct. John Watson writes of the New Experimental Ethics which will sooner or later supplant the "thou shalts" and the "thou shalt nots" of real moral imperatives. Bertrand Russell contends

for the New Scientific Ethics which would judge the rightness or wrongness of conduct by its consequences. He holds that the supreme moral rule should be: Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. His conclusion is that the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.

Now I have not time or space to enter into an elaborate discussion of morals. Suffice it to say that the race in general has held to a moral order. When civilization has hewn to the line of moral imperatives, all has gone well. When it has deviated from these moral sanctions and made pleasure or utility or selfishness the end of living, a debacle has ensued. These old moral sanctions still have possession of the field. Possession is nine-tenths of the law in philosophy. When morality does lose its own sacred canons and imperatives and is evaporated into hedonism or utilitarianism, then the term itself will disappear. When that tragic day dawns, it will usher in the final debacle of civilization. Before it comes, permit me to say that all moral sanctions that are worthy of the name are rooted and grounded in personality. The dual foundations of God and man are their base. They cannot exist on the foundations of idle abstractions or on mere utility. That unique part of personality that has to do with the realm of morals we call the conscience. It is still with us in this naturalistic age, even if its voice is almost drowned by the raucous tones of naturalism. As Major Povah well argues, righteousness implies personality.

III

In conclusion I would note certain arguments for personality that might be styled distinctly philosophical. I

know of no better method of dealing with this argument for the ego, than to make a passing comment on some developments of psychic theory for the past three hundred years. The father of modern introspection was Descartes. As Knight Dunlap argues, the psychological tradition that believed in introspection, interaction, the non-observability of relations, and the tenets of the idea psychology in general passed from him thru Malebranche down to modern times, when the scientific, reaction psychology is supplanting the old beliefs. There were three substances for Descartes—mind, body and God. Subsequent thinkers laid hold of each, and went off at a tangent into philosophic speculation. Berkeley took over the mind substance, and gave us his psychological idealism. Spinoza became intoxicated with the God-substance and wrought out the most scientific theory of pantheism the world has ever seen. David Hume took up the body side of the matter and developed his theory of sensationalism. All psychic life is made up of sensations, and their faint copies called ideas. The generating power in psychology is the association of ideas. There is no static or unified personality but only the flux of experience. All is change. David Hume was the forerunner of all stream theories in psychology, whether it be streams of consciousness, as with James, or of action, as with Watson. He is the highpriest of sensationalism and of a constant change. But in making the predication of change, is he not actually *positing himself* as a fixed point of identity, as an observer of the passing flux? "But what about Mr. Hume himself? Is he also a passing moment in the show?" asks Ormond in his *Philosophy of Religion* (page 101). If everything changes, there would be no fixed point of reference from which

all change could be measured, and the very notion of change would vanish. During the great Mississippi flood last year, I went down to the levee at Friar's Point when the waters were at their height. It was a wonderful and awful scene before me. The yellow, turgid waters of the Old Father of Rivers flowed by me carrying on its bosom trees, wreckage of various kinds, and great barges full of refugees, their cattle, horses and few possessions rescued from the flood. The raging current was attacking with fury the main levee and the spur on which I stood and seemed determined to eat it away. The waters were lapping at my very feet. What a scene of change and fluidity! But in making that very description did I not take for granted myself as a fixed point of reference, a constant observer on the banks? If all had been in a state of flux—the river, the steamboats, the trees, the levee and I myself—there would have been no fixed point from which to measure any change, and the whole notion would evaporate. So I hope that it is evident to all that even Mr. Hume, in speaking of the fluidity and change of the stream of consciousness is implying all the while the unity and identity of personality. Just as personality is involved in this judgment of change, so it could easily be shown that it is implied in all other judgments, whether relating to substance, relation, mode or causation, and is the ground on which these are formulated.

The reaction from the sensationalism of Hume is found in Immanuel Kant. The history of thought in general has given him credit for saving not only any real scientific thought but also the reality of the ego from the ravages of skeptical thought. Bertrand Russell, in his *Philosophy* (page 80), does not agree with this orthodox position about

Kant. He says that he deluged the philosophic world with muddle and mystery. He helped to take all of the adventure and "kick" out of speculation and investigation. Perhaps so! But I would remind Russell that science had to be brought to life again before there could be any "kick" to it. There could be no "kick" to a dead science. Kant is the protagonist of the sense of unity and power of integration of the personality. He calls this quality of the ego by the pretentious phrase, "The transcendental unity of apperception." Undoubtedly Kant saved the reality and integrity of the self, and all real thought from the skepticism of mere sensationalism. He made science, philosophy and psychology possible. But it must be admitted that his defence of the integrity and unity of personality is of little practical value to psychology. His ego has no real content. It is not open to introspection or study. It has no real existence apart from its necessary function of integration in sense experience. It is a mere logical identity, and not a real flesh and blood personality.

This weakness of holding to a mere abstraction is all the more evident in the Hegelian line of thinkers who followed Kant. They are enamored of hypostatizings. They worship at the shrine of empty abstractions. I cry out for the bread of a real, throbbing, vital person, and I am fed the stones of a principle of non-contradiction, a point of logical identity or a mere category of thought. This is true of the whole brilliant Hegelian line. As Seth says, their characteristic error seems to have been "the error of sacrificing the moral life, with all its concrete reality of living, throbbing, human sensibility on the altar of intellect or cool philosophic reason." Whether we consider Green's *Eternal Consciousness*, or Edward Caird's *Prin-*

ciple of Unity, or Bradley's *Absolute*, they have persisted in reducing the human equation to a mere logical or mathematical one. They have run off with one faculty of human personality, the intellect, have abstracted and abstracted from it, and have claimed that this empty hypostatizing was the final substance in God and man.

We come down to William James and his attitude toward personality. He distinguished between the self as knower and the self as known as Kant had done. The former is a purely metaphysical question and should not enter the sphere of psychology. The self as known he divided into the material, social and spiritual "mes," with a certain hierarchy of these various "mes." We find that A. T. Ormond, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, distinguishes between the real and the empirical self. The latter is represented by the flowing stream of conscious existence that constantly changes and takes on new acquisitions. The soul that cognizes and judges the passing stream is the *real self* that has an abiding stand on the rock of permanent being. Here we have a vital distinction in any theory of personality. I would rather make the distinction between the real self and its acquisitions, possessions and experiences. These latter are constantly being changed, added to, subtracted from and modified out in the passing stream of every-day existence. But there is a real abiding self that unifies, integrates, and appropriates these sundry experiences.

Today behaviorism has changed somewhat the status of the personality doctrine. In many ways this strange psychic theory has tended to clarify the issue. The behaviorist holds that the same objections of mysticism and supernaturalism that were hurled at the doctrine of personality hold equally

as well against consciousness, the instincts, introspection, and memory. Hence he discards the stream of consciousness along with the real ego.

The behaviorist is right. The charge of mysticism may just as well be made against the stream of consciousness, the instincts and all inner life in general as against personality itself. John Watson claims that all psychologies before his own were founded on a religious basis. He is right in a sense. This contention has cleared the psychic atmosphere, somewhat as a sudden stroke of lightning clears up the murky air of a sultry day. It shows conclusively that no half-baked doctrines of personality, such as those postulated on the hormic theory or some mere organization of habits, will suffice. It demolishes them just as conclusively as it does all real personality tenets. The line of cleavage in psychology has been rendered more clear-cut than ever between purposive and non-purposive psychologies. It is either behaviorism or personality. It is either psychology or physiology. The only recourse now against behaviorism is in a real ego that unifies, co-ordinates and makes rational the data of experience. Any defence that is less strong than this will crumble before the assaults of naturalism.

Really behaviorism, the most objective of all psychologies, does not dispense with the human equation. What it does is to kick personality and all its attributes out the front door of the mind, and, lo! they come sneaking in the back door. The behaviorist cannot get along in his studies and investigations without the characteristics of personality. He is constantly observing and making interpretations of his investigations. All these judgments and observations demand the unifying and integrating power of personality

that alone makes judgment possible. He holds that there is a distinction between truth and error. That implies some goal in thinking, some thought initiative. He is ever setting goals and ends in his experiments, and that fact implies the purposive side of the ego. He speaks of his individual's possessing various patterns and habit systems and organizing his life into various conditioned reflexes. Now possessions imply a possessor. My various possessions imply my personality. If I die, the possessions cannot go on in their own right. The court takes steps to tie them on to another personality. Organization demands an organizer. Real organizations, whether in the human system or in the United States Steel Trust, do not just fall together. They demand a head, an organizer, a chief executive. Thus we see that even behaviorism demands the human equation that it may give a rational answer to its own problems of objective experimentation.

Such are some of the arguments for personality. I am pleading for that most real, most vital part of man's being. I am contending for what exists apart from the passing flux of daily living—its disappointments, its ups and downs, its bargainings and sellings. I am pleading for what gives purpose and direction to human life. I am pleading for that which is really independent of the passing trials and changes. I am arguing for what kings and prisons and persecution cannot really touch. It is that unique, indescribable sense of individuality that differentiates you from your surroundings, and from every other being in God's universe. When Palissy, the famous inventor of French pottery, was condemned to death and thrown into the Bastille, King Henry III went to see him and told him that he pitied him very much and would like to set him

free, but that he was so "constrained" by his enemies that he could not, unless he recanted his religious faith. As Wiggam has told us, the unconquerable old man replied, "It is I, Your Majesty, who pities you when you say, 'I am constrained.' It is not spoken like a king. All the enemies in the world can never constrain me, because I know how to die." Palissy had delved into the depths of his being and found his real personality. The king had not. The French Bastille that had attempted to constrain and destroy so many personalities has fallen. Go there today and you will find only the column of July in the midst of a vast circular place and a few paving stones that mark the site of the old prison. It has gone forever; but the heroic remark of a victorious personality that had found itself abides.

CHAPTER IV

MEETING THE OBJECTIONS



COME now to a consideration of the objections that the modern mind has raised against the doctrine of personality. I think that these can best be met by stating the tenet in the right way. It will then be found that most of the objections have been aimed not at a valid doctrine of the ego, but at some man of straw that the controversialist has constructed out of his own mind. If personality is viewed, not as a static, abstract point of identity, but as a dynamic, purposive entity that functions here and now in daily experience thru the bodily organism, imparting to the whole man a certain sense of unity, identity and individuality, then most of the objections take the wings of the morning and fly away. In much present-day discussion, there is large use made of caricature. The opponents of real personality have caricatured the doctrine. Then they have aimed their objections, not at such an ego as I have outlined above, but at their manufactured man of straw. Let us notice some of these false characterizations of the ego. One caricature is that the subject is a sort of mystical, ghost-like entity that dwells in the clouds, transcendent to all human experience, and ever and anon descends and miraculously interferes with psychic activity as a kind of *deus ex machina*. Now this is a pure man of straw. No real believer in personality holds to a tenet like this. The ego, while more than the nervous system, is immanent in experience, and functions here and now thru the whole organism. Another caricature would represent the ego as

some static point of logical identity that can neither be added to nor taken from. It stands in the center of human experience, like the lone column of Phocas in the midst of the Roman Forum. The only changes which can be made to it are by a sort of addition in a purely mechanical way. But, no! personality is no static, mathematical point that resists all change, but a dynamic, purposive entity that holds together, integrates and individualizes all experience. Another man of straw would represent personality as necessarily leading to the old faculty psychology. The ego would be divided like a house into three air-tight compartments that function independently of each other, and have no commerce the one with the other. This dread of the return of the faculty psychology might threaten many a timid believer in personality. Frankly I think that the whole picture of the nature of the faculty psychology has been overdrawn. I do not believe that there is or ever has been any belief in three hermetically sealed compartments of the mind (intellect, feelings and will) that function in an absolutely independent manner. The thinker of today needs these three aspects of the human ego, and invents other names such as the cognitive, affective and conative sides of consciousness. But it is a pure caricature that would try to equate a belief in personality with faculty psychology. I hold that most of the modern objections to personality are relevant not to a valid doctrine of the ego, but only to the out-and-out caricatures which we have suggested.

But there is one aspect of the personality doctrine that demands some attention. That is, the connection of the belief with substance doctrines. Our forefathers were wont to define personality as a substance with certain well-defined attributes such as identity, indestructibility, simplic-

ity, etc. What shall we say about this method of defence of the self? This construction of the ego on a substance doctrine was useful in its day, and served well to defend the belief in personality. If we lay hold of the essential point here that the fundamental fact in all substance doctrines is to establish and maintain the *real abiding* existence of the subject against all mere sensational and stream theories of experience, then I say that the substance doctrine has value today for those who use it wisely. In developing the position that personality has the attributes of unity, identity and individuality, that these qualities are present in our here-and-now experience, that the self perdures throughout the flux of living, I think that I am preserving for modern though the most vital features of the old substance doctrine. It is difficult to present the doctrine of the two substances, mental and material, that underlie subjective and objective phenomena in a way that is appealing to the modern mind, especially as that mind interprets current scientific data and theories. The whole notion seems extremely nebulous. I think that a more strategic defence of personality can be erected today on the categories of purpose.

There are certain dangers attendant on a use of the substance doctrine in psychology. One is the tendency of the human mind to worship abstractions. The doctrine of substance has always been rooted in certain well-defined philosophies. It figured largely in the views of the great continental thinkers, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, and can with difficulty be disengaged from these philosophic settings. For the Christian thinker the interesting fact is the connection of this doctrine with the early Trinitarian debates. In working out the doctrine of the Trinity, our

fathers made use of certain well-defined terms. One is the word "Ousia" or Essence or Substance, which denotes that which is common to Father, Son and Spirit. Another term was "Hypostasis," which denotes not that which is common to the Three in One, but that which is distinctive of and peculiar to each. The personal characteristic of the Hypostasis was denoted by the word "Idiotes," and if we use our English word, "Individuality," somewhat loosely, it will convey the idea sought to be attached to the Person in distinction from the Essence. Later the Greek word, "Prosopon," and the Latin word, "Persona," were used to bring out the hypostatic distinction. The Latin "persona" was the mask worn by the actor in the play, and was representative of his particular character for the particular time. I am delving back into these hoary debates, not from a purely antiquarian interest, but to make it plain that the ideas of "Substance," "Essence," and "Person" have been vitally connected with theological discussion. When we come to psychology, it is practically impossible for the Christian thinker to divorce the terms from their theological setting. Now I have never believed that it was right or scientific for a thinker to come to psychology with a religious bias—or any other kind of a bias—to defend. I have heard lecturers who came to a study of human personality with a certain set of theological presuppositions about substance and essence and personality to defend. I think that is contrary to the spirit of free and untrammelled inquiry. Divine psychology and human psychology must not be confused. We must study the doctrine of personality entirely on its own merits, untrammelled by Trinitarian and Christological nomenclature. I firmly believe that these theological battles must be set-

tled and the proper terms used, but I doubt the wisdom of trying to carry these theological presuppositions and terms over into psychology. The great danger in all these discussions is that the human mind is inclined to worship the idols of abstraction. The whole substance doctrine is conducive to this very idolatry. To hypostatize means to abstract or to draw away from concrete human experience. It is a relic of the bad use of the faculty psychology. Worshiping abstractions means that I take the faculty of the intellect, and divorcing it from the rest of personality, go off at a tangent into pure scholasticism and intellectualism.

Another danger attendant on a use of the substance doctrine in psychology is that it may soon run off into a veiled materialism. Undoubtedly many thinkers have made a wise use of the substance doctrine in psychology. But with some the finely-spun, invisible substance that constituted personality was only an attenuated, ethereal material entity. It was subject to the same laws of causation, governed by the same canons. When the idea of determinism was taken over from materialism and given the high sounding sobriquet of "psychical determinism," then psychology's marriage to naturalism was complete. The substance underlying personality was of the same texture as material essences, but of a finer, more ethereal nature. Surely the erection of a personality like this does psychology and its human interests and ideals little good. We had just as well hold on to materialism. Science sees no necessity for this attenuated, invisible material substance, with laws identical with nature, when it can get along with the nervous system and the endocrine glands.

Now I hold that the doctrine of substances did good service in its day. I have no objection to its use today, if proper safeguards are thrown about its employment. I am claiming that it is not the best method of approach to the personality problem at this time. I think the doctrine needs to be erected on a new foundation.

I have gone into detail in regard to these various false notions about personality to show that most of the modern objections are levelled not at a valid construction of the ego, but at some caricature. If the belief in an immanent personality that functions here and now in a purposive way in experience and imparts to all activity a sense of unity, identity and individuality—if such a doctrine is accepted, then the objections are seen to have little force. But let us note them a little more in detail.

I

There is the objection that the whole notion of personality is supernatural. At the outset it is evident that this is aimed at the caricature of personality which represents it as utterly transcendent to experience and as interfering with nervous reactions in a sort of miraculous way. But this is not the kind of personality that we are defending.

Let us examine this whole notion of the supernatural, not in its theological signification, but in its bearing on the question at issue. If by the term the naturalist means those orders of experience that are above the mechanical realm, that are subject to their own unique categories, that have their own rights, then the accusation that real personality is supernatural, is true. But the verdict would hold equally as well against art, morality, religion, and, in fact, against all of those levels of reality that are above the

purely natural. When psychology and philosophy make their declaration of independence, throw off the chains of naturalism, and declare their avowed intention to rule under their own rights, categories and laws, then they are in a position to preserve, not only personality, but also all other spiritual values. The theory of the autonomy of the various sciences and studies is a most important one. It was a great step forward when science threw off the medieval shackles of superstition, ecclesiasticism and false philosophy, and asserted her autonomy. That epochal occasion made possible the wonderful scientific advances of the past three hundred years. It is equally as important a day when psychology and philosophy cease to do obeisance to naturalism and assert in no uncertain tones their right to exist and to investigate not under the laws of physics and chemistry but under their own peculiar categories. The full consequences of the autonomy of philosophy and psychology have yet to be realized by the world of thought. When this position is once grasped, personality and other spiritual values will no longer be regarded as supernatural beings but as entities that are needed to rationalize experience.

If by the term "supernatural" we mean that personality dwells utterly apart from experience, and interferes now and then in a sort of miraculous way, then I would reply that our whole development of the doctrine rebuts that position. I am defending not a self that is transcendent to experience but one that is immanent and functions as an effective agent thru the various nervous and glandular organizations. I maintain that a purposive self is the only agent that can impart unity, and co-ordination to these various organizations.

Let us examine the position of naturalism, especially in its modern setting. The cause of naturalism has received a rude jolt from modern tendencies in physics. The older naturalism went directly or indirectly on the assumption that the ultimate datum in the material world was a certain indivisible monad that composed all reality. But modern physics no longer believes in any clear-cut, hard and fast particle of matter. That old notion of an ultimate material particle at the base of everything is gone. Physics today has a decidedly spiritual bent. Every atom is a structure consisting of electrons and protons. Every hydrogen atom, which is the simplest, consists of one proton with one electron going round it as a planet revolves about the sun. This is the Bohr theory of the atom. This notion of the material world's being a planetary system of revolving electrons and protons is decidedly different from the old notion of the objective order being made up of ultimate fine particles of matter. The prop has dropped out of naturalism. Now a new theory of the atom is about to supplant the view of Bohr. It is the view of Schroedinger. Here the electric charge is not localized in spots as with Bohr; but is spread everywhere throughout the volume of a little sphere of atomic dimensions. This is the wave theory of the atom. With Bohr it is a miniature solar system. The electrons in Bohr's atom are in rapid motion about their orbits, while in the Schroedinger atom the electric charge does not move about. Such are some of the latest views of matter. I do not profess to understand them. They only go to show that the poor atom rests on rather an unstable foundation, and that its constitution is still at the mercy of the theorizings of the personal equation. But it must be evident that the prop has dropped out of

naturalism. Then the notion that the objective order is one continuous series with no jumps or skips has gone by the board. Bertrand Russell, in his *Philosophy*, says that apparently nature does make jumps, not only now and then, but whenever a body emits light, as well as on certain other occasions. The German physicist, Planck, was the first to demonstrate the necessity of jumps. If physics admits that there are discontinuities and jumps in nature, then all the objections that cluster about the notion that personality will bring skips and jumps into psychic experience, and is thus supernatural, will fall to the ground.

Herbert Dingle, in the *Hibbert Journal* (October, 1928), says that the very latest theory of matter has veered away even from the planetary hypothesis, which we have noticed, in the direction of a more abstract, mathematical conception. The atom is now a set of metrical concepts with prescribed properties. "The actual is literally evolved out of the idea." The import of this for a doctrine of personality lies in the fact that it is a further blow at the notion of matter as a hard and fast monad, and a further step towards that abstract, mathematical and spiritual interpretation of things which must have personality as a foundation or else fall to the ground. I might add that all these developments in science would make it still harder to win over the scientific mind to substance doctrines, especially as the notion of a final substance was applied to objective phenomena.

Really the whole notion of the uniformity of nature has been made a fetish by modern thinkers. It is merely a description of what nature has done so far. It has no dynamic, driving power. Bertrand Russell, in speaking of certain laws of physics, says that these general laws do not

state that anything will actually happen: they state a tendency, and lead to the conclusion that what actually happens is the resultant of a number of tendencies. If these great laws are only tendencies, the whole notion of the uniformity of natural law and of its sway over experience will go. Shall we erect what nature has done in the past into an absolute and infallible law as to what she will do in the future? The spirit of modern science answers, "No." With the passing of the dictum of the uniformity of natural law goes also the whole notion of absolute determinism from science. Yet here has been its stronghold for centuries. So powerfully was it entrenched and so invulnerable seemed its position that it has sent out expeditions to conquer the allied provinces of psychology, philosophy and theology. But if determinism has been routed from the sphere of natural science, it certainly has lost entirely its hold in the other realms. This routing of determinism from the sphere of science is an epochal occasion. It has made vastly easier the defence of personality. The idols erected to the uniformity of natural law as a dynamic power and to determinism have been destroyed. No longer is the past an infallible guarantee of what nature holds in her lap for the future. If this were so, then the uniformity of nature at the time of David Hume could have been erected into an infallible dictum that would have precluded the discovery of the telephone, the wireless and the radio, for these data were not known then. The tenets of determinism and the uniformity of natural law would erect what I happen to know of nature right now into an insuperable bar to any new and novel discoveries in the future. I must not disturb the uniformity of natural law. But I reply that such a spirit would destroy modern science.

The law of relativity has likewise tended to a subjectivist interpretation of physics. There are no absolute cosmic space and time. There is only a private space-time for each individual. The ultimate datum in physics is not a body, but an event with a history. There are no direct relations between distant events. Everything goes from next to next. Far be it from me to understand or explain this new physics. But it is evident that it is tending in a spiritual direction. With the denial of the ultimate hard and fast particle of matter, the foundation fell from under the old naturalism. No longer can modern thought say that it cannot accept the doctrine of personality because it will disturb the continuity of nature and produce a break. No longer can current thought object to a belief in the ego, because this existence is a mysterious, invisible entity that it cannot understand. I would reply to such an objection, "Surely the ego is no more mysterious and invisible than the planetary movements of the electrons and protons that are at the basis of material existence. Will you reject the ego because you do not understand how it can function in experience? Does the mystery and inexplicability of a thing make you refuse to accept it in science? What could be more mysterious than the law of relativity and the laws of a radio activity in physics. Surely inexplicability is no bar to acceptance here, and it should not be in psychology. The question is not whether the given data are mysterious, but whether they are facts. You go on the assumption that the objective world is known immediately and directly and that the inner world is remote and far fetched. That is naive and uncritical. You do not know the external world in its essential nature any better, if as well, as you do the world of the spirit. The latest theory of perception is that there is a causal chain leading from an

event in the objective world thru a nexus of occurrences to an event in the brain of the percipient. The only feature that is immediate and direct is in the brain of the subject. The ultimate nature of the external event is a matter of theory and hypothesis." Such would be my answer to modern science. Modern physics as expounded by such men as Michael Pupin, Sir Oliver Lodge, Millikin and others has become, not an opponent, but an ally of the believer in a real personality functioning in experience.

II.

Let us note the objection that a belief in personality is not scientific. Undoubtedly great strides have been made in scientific psychology in the past century. But purposive psychology accepts all that is best in valid scientific investigation. It does not hold that the ego functions in a purely spiritual, disembodied manner, but in and thru the whole organism and especially the nervous system. Purposive psychology welcomes all the study that has been made of the endocrine glands and of the effects of their secretions and condition on the balance and harmony of the emotional life and in fact of the whole organism. It even accepts the studies in objective psychology and action of the behaviorists. It is interested in an investigation of the instincts and of the great drives of life. It is sympathetic to the investigations of the reactions to tests of apes as formulated by Wolfgang Koehler and the Gestalt psychologists. But in accepting all valid scientific discoveries, it insists that there is a "more," a "plus" about experience that many of these investigators overlook, and that this "more" is personality. I believe that the implications of this "plus,"

not only in psychology, but in all lines of scientific investigation, point to personality. I have already referred to the spiritual turn that has been given to physics. Perhaps the aspect of personality that most interests the physicist is that sense of individuality that is seen in a rose, an automobile, a Mount Blanc, and that is decidedly more than the mere addition or conglomeration of various physical elements. Just the other day Sir Wm. Bragg, President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, asserted his belief in the existence of the soul, and said, "Science is not so foolish as to throw away that in which the slowly gathered wisdom of the ages is stored." The new biological theory of Dr. Austin H. Clark, of the Smithsonian Institute, that each major group is a special animal-complex related more closely to all the rest and appearing, therefore, as a special and distinct creation, and that man is not a cousin to the ape but an accident, an abnormality—this epochal view constitutes a most decided "plus" sign in biology. Much of the biology of the past with its theory of the absolute continuity of animal and human development, with its belief that all progress was generated by the survival of chance variations, with its absolute rejection of all supernatural elements at any point in the process, with its ruling out of all vitalistic canons in favour of the laws of mechanism—such views have presented a "minus" sign to personality. The holistic theory of development of General J. C. Smuts is outlined in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1928 (page 148). This teaches that the tendency of evolution is toward the creation of wholes complete in themselves, unified and not composed of discrete units. "Thus, in the structure of a crystal, the atoms of the component elements are not merely placed in just

a position, but are broken up and rearranged. It is not a case of symbiosis, but of a totally new creation, of a whole that transcends the sum of its parts." Even medicine has its "plus" sign. It was significant that at the general convention of the Episcopal Church a joint commission of bishops and deputies declared "that Christian healing has passed beyond the stage of experiment and its value cannot be questioned." Among the signers of this report were some of the most celebrated physicians in this country. Now all of these "plus" signs, it seems to me, point to the existence of a real self that is an effective agent in experience.

Yes, purposive psychology is distinctly scientific—in fact, it is the only psychology that is. That is scientific which best explains all of the data of experience and which does it most adequately. I hope I have made it plain that the hypothesis of personality best explains and interprets all the data of experience on all the levels of reality—the planes of sensationalism, thinking, the emotions, the will, the moral life and the religious aspirations. It and it, alone, will properly integrate, unify, co-ordinate and harmonize all the diverse elements that make up human experience. It is just as scientific an hypothesis as the theory of radio activity in physics. It is necessary to make all the facts in the case rational. The fact that there are some mysteries about the doctrine should not militate against it any more than against the tenets of relativity and other mysterious beliefs in modern science. This ability to rationalize all the facts in the case is science in the best, truest sense of the word. Whitehead, in *Religion in the Making*, argues that the universe is interdependent. The body pollutes the mind; the mind pollutes the body. Physical energy sublimates itself into zeal; conversely zeal stimulates the body.

A mental occasion is an ultimate fact in the spiritual world just as a physical occasion of blind perceptivity is an ultimate fact in the physical world. Thus one of our greatest scientists argues for the reality and efficiency in experience of personality.

Before we answer another objection to personality, let us note the celebrated body-mind problem. How can the soul, a spiritual substance, act on a body which is a material essence? That is the issue in a nutshell. Various and sundry have been the attempted solutions. There are the various theories of monism that essay to bring the correct answer to this enigma. These would reduce the two orders—mind and body—to one, and thus reduce them to a causal nexus of the same kind. Materialistic monism would level all psychic facts to the plane of mechanism. To adopt a different figure, these two theories would attempt to run the train of experience either on the materialistic or the idealistic tracks. If the train runs on the naturalistic track it takes the low grade, the route that is below the sea level of ordinary living. It runs below all our thinking, high ideals, noble endeavours and moral sanctions. If the train of experience takes the idealistic track, it is on the higher route, in the mountain country. The trouble is that it is too high; and the air is too rarified for ordinary thinking or scientific work. We get dizzy traversing the heights of speculation. It runs above all the stations of our common thinking and striving, and is in grave danger of passing up that important stop of scientific psychology where real, honest, scientific observation and experimentation take place. Then there is the theory of parallelism. This is a double-track affair. On one track the train of mental events runs; and on the other the train

of physical and nervous reactions. The train of experience runs as a double-header. The two lines will never cross. The mental and physical never influence each other. But this theory is unduly mysterious and incomprehensible. The practical result of this double-track theory is that most of the freight of daily living and scientific experimentation is carried on the naturalistic line, and consciousness is made a mere steam whistle on the train that runs on the road of idealism. Again, there is the double-aspect theory. This holds that both elements—mind and body—are manifestations of a third something, a mysterious *tertium quid*. But such a theory can never be verified. What and where is this *tertium quid* that underlies both mind and matter? Then, to change our figure, I am always suspicious when this theory comes wearing the garments of true spirituality. On examination it turns out to be a wolf in sheep's clothing. The supposed habiliments of the spiritual are nothing but the same old vestments of naturalism.

What is the solution of this age-long problem? Perhaps you are asking yourself this query, "What contribution will the author make to this hoary debate?" Well, I do not believe that much profit will result from going over the old arguments that I have outlined. They have been worn thread-bare. Far be it from me to claim that I can solve this mind-body problem. But I claim that a new method of treatment, and an approach to the whole question from a new angle, will throw light upon the problems at issue. In this connection I would call attention to the following relevant considerations.

In the first place, let us note the proper form of stating the question. It should not be put, "Has man a soul?" but "Is he a soul?" When you ask the former question you

imply that personality is a sort of possession which man has about him, and can hold in his hand and study. If personality is a mere possession, then it may be in the pineal gland, as Descartes held, or somewhere between the head and the throat, as William James held. This statement of the issue multiplies our difficulties, and makes a rational presentation of the fact of personality and its effectiveness in experience very hard. What I am trying to maintain is this: "Man *is* a soul. He *is* a personality that functions in and thru experience and unifies and co-ordinates it."

In the next place, I am asking for a candid recognition of the two elements—matter and spirit—in experience and of their interaction. It is not a question of whether we can explain this commerce between the two orders, but of whether this reciprocity actually exists. This dualism and interaction face us on every hand. The brute fact is that the various levels of reality—art, science, morality and religion—do interact in experience. In the unity of our experience we are never thinking of trying to disentangle the various elements that enter into the warp and woof of daily living. We never set up antitheses between the diverse strata of reality, and wonder how they can interact. We do not do this in regard to the daily commerce between mind and body. Hoernlé, in his *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, makes this point very clear. He asks (page 261) whether it is really satisfactory to analyze the experience of being bitten by a mosquito, by assigning the bite to the body and the itch to the soul. Surely daily experience does not reveal any wide chasm between body and soul, with mind on one side of the abyss every now and then casting influences and orders across to the body. It is only certain philosophers who, by their abstractions, have

created this hopeless abyss in experience. Surely speculation should learn a lesson here. In all our conclusions about the body-mind problem it is wise to stick as close as possible to experience and the revelations that it makes. One of the many advantages of beginning the argument, as I have tried to do, with the inescapable sense of purpose that is found in all psychic experience, is that I am keeping close to the facts and testimony of daily life and activity and not wandering off into the arid lands of abstruse speculation. As Dr. D. M. Allen well says in the *Union Seminary Review* (October, 1928, in his article, "The Soul and Body in Modern Psychology," page 95): "But the inescapable conclusion to me at least is that mind and body are no fenced off realms; nor is one of them a fairy story; but both exist and function together in a glorious democracy of mutual causation." Now this reciprocity between mind and body is the plain and inescapable testimony of experience, and surely it is scientific to recognize it. We must distinguish between the many theories that could attempt to explain this mystery, and the fact of interaction. Surely it is not scientific to reject a plain fact of daily experience because that fact is a mystery. Science is daily accepting the existence of facts when the theory of the given datum is as yet undiscovered. Rather than to deny outright the commerce between mind and matter, would it not be better to accept this patent datum, and then to "carry on" in the hope of later finding the true theory. That, it seems to me, is the proper attitude for a true science and for an heroic attitude to life. I hold that the reciprocity between mind and matter is inescapable. The "how" of this commerce is as yet a mystery, but should not cause us to reject the plain fact of interaction, as evidenced by ex-

perience. That body and soul are of different natures and belong to different realms, we acknowledge. They are part of that perennial dualism that has ever haunted the history of thought. The problem of the one and the many in Greek philosophy, of the realm of ideas and the flux of experience in Plato, of the relationship of body and soul in Descartes, of free agency and divine sovereignty in theology, of mechanism and vitalism in biology—these facts betoken the ineluctable dualism that haunts all experience. Sometimes it is better frankly to recognize a duality of nature than to become hyper-speculative and get lost in the maze and bypaths of fantastic philosophizing. More, in *Christ the Word* (page 195, 196), claims that after the Church Fathers at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 had attempted to settle the problem of the two natures in Christ, later thinkers should have stuck by this simple statement of the dualism. He holds that, when later councils attempted to make the mystery more rational by lugging in Aristotelian philosophy, psychology and speculations about the two wills in Christ, they only befogged the issue. Perhaps the same lesson should apply to us in dealing with this mystery. I claim that the fact of the reciprocity between soul and body is inescapable. The two belong to different realms of reality and have different natures. Let the case rest there. Highly speculative attempts to explain the mystery usually end up by doing violence to mind or matter or to their interaction.

Finally, I believe that our presentation of the problem will tend to clarify the issue by the new emphases of treatment and the escaping of certain needless antitheses. I am contending for a self that is immanent and purposive in experience and yet can transcend the constant flux. On

all levels of psychic activity I have tried to show that the mind is purposive. On the lower levels, we choose our sensations, accept some stimuli from the external world and reject others. As I walk down the street a flood of stimuli play upon me. But I reject all of those that pertain to the styles and dress of the ladies and attend to those that tell me about my favorite golf ball or club or my radio. In a similar way the mind selects its memories. From the great depository of past stimulations and experiences, you bring forth those recollections that are pertinent to the business at hand. Equally significant is the mind's choice of forgettings. We seldom "just" forget. The bill we owe, the unpleasant dose of medicine, the "boring" call—how prone these are to be forgotten. Freud holds that the things we forget reveal much about our unconscious minds. This selective power of the mind is seen in the choice of acts and motives to acts. Brain energy may flood many thousands of motor pathways. But in accordance with that "will" policy of which I have spoken, the energy is directed into selected routes and discharges into appropriate teams of muscles. As Dr. D. M. Allen says in the article referred to (page 94), "If all this be true, the mind selects its stimuli, its memories, its motor habits and skills, its motives and purposes—and all in accordance with its own standards of value. In so doing it shows its autonomy and relative independence of the body." That is precisely my position. The self is immanent in experience as a purposive agent, and yet it can transcend the flux, as it does in thinking, selecting, unifying the various systems and especially in the sovereign act of choice.

This presentation of the doctrine should abolish certain false antitheses that have arisen in the past. It is not mat-

ter set over against spirit; but spirit and matter. It is not naturalism versus purpose; but purpose and natural laws. It is not mechanism versus vitalism; but mechanism and teleology. We would replace these various disjunctions that have so confused thought by the conjunctions that are necessary to experience. This is the position of Hoernlé as outlined in his *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics* (page 144). In his latest book, *Idealism as a Philosophy*, he offers absolute idealism as the key to unlock these mysteries. We present a valid doctrine of personality in both God and man as a more satisfactory solution. This is really a combination of the biological theory of the soul of Aristotle and the introspective view of Descartes. For the former there were vegetable, animal and human souls or entelechies. When any object passed from potentiality to actuality, there we had a soul. When any body fulfilled its function, it possessed a soul. Descartes started with introspection. He put a hopeless chasm between soul and body, and later philosophy was kept busy trying to bridge the abyss. Here is a solemn lesson for modern believers in dualism. Let them not build their argument on the chasm, for if science should some day discover the spiritual nature of matter, this abyss might be bridged and then their argument would be on a flimsy foundation. But let them build their argument on the presence of mind and matter in experience and on their reciprocity. In accentuating purpose as the foundation of our doctrine, we are trying to do away with many false and needless antitheses. It is not purpose versus natural law; but purpose acting thru law. It is not the materials of a building versus the architect; but both architect and building material. The presence of purpose does not destroy the nexus of material

sequences. I pass a lot where many brick, stones and much lumber are piled up. I do not know what the purpose of the architect will lead him to build. But whether it be a residence or a temple, the sequence of natural causes and effects—the work of the hammer, saw, chisel and trowel—will be fulfilled. When I pass the lot several months later and see the finished building—whatever it may be—I never doubt for one moment that all of the material sequences were fulfilled or that the architect's purpose interacted on and influenced the building. Such is the co-ordinating, harmonizing, unifying mission of personality.

Thus we believe that the doctrine of personality is most scientific and that it alone will rationalize experience. These same arguments would tend to prove that immanent in the universe and transcendent to it is the great Personality we call God. The late Dr. E. Y. Mullins, in the *Biblical Review* for April (1928), in an article, entitled "Humanizing Our Philosophy" (page 227), held that the notion of personality is a type-phenomenon which offers itself as the true goal of thought, because most adequately interpretative of the meaning of the universe. As we follow the trail with personality as a guide, we will never be satisfied until we reach the source and foundation of all true soul-life, God. When Blaise Pascal, the great Jansenist, died, a document was found upon his heart. In it were these words, "Certitude, certitude, feeling, joy, peace, the God of Jesus Christ." That was the end of the long, long trail for that heroic soul, and it will be for everyone who follows the leadings of personality.

III

I would next note the objection that the doctrine of personality violates the flow and constant accretions of experience. Let us look at this point as it applies to the normal life of man with his increase in knowledge, his new acquisitions and his daily additions to experience. This objection is postulated on the assumption that personality is a static unity, a sort of lone column to which the other elements in experience are cemented and mortised in a purely mechanical way as the material in a building. But the ego is not such a static center around which the other factors in experience are builded. It is not static but dynamic. It is a purposive, assimilative entity that binds the flux of experience into a unified, rational whole.

The solution of this difficulty will depend on whether we make use of the principle of abstract identity, and demand that every object shall have an absolute character, a character that does not vary with varying conditions, but which remains mathematically unchanged and fixed; or whether we interpret the principle of identity concretely as identity in difference. As Hoernlé well shows, the philosophers who have tried to use the principle of abstract identity have had little success. If we demand that there shall be abstract identity in all objects—selves, houses, plants and animals—then we will never again either think or experiment. No object in the universe ever remains for one moment identically and mathematically the same. Let us realize that the principle and problem of identity is not different here from its application to all other objects in the universe. For example, I let a friend have my Nash car for a week. When he brings it back, I look it over and

decide it is the same car. Why? On the principle of abstract identity? Decidedly no, for it is not in a mathematical and abstract sense the same car. The tires are older and worn, one of the fenders is bent, part of the body has taken on rust. I decide it is the same Nash car because its innate form, its basic structure, its unique individuality, its principle of organization are the same. My problem was solved not by the principle of static, abstract identity, but by the concept of a dynamic, concrete identity. The point I am trying to make is that this problem of identity in change is no whit different in the case of growing souls from what it is with every other object. Both problem and solution are the same. Perhaps the solution is easier in the matter of personality than it is with my Nash car. The principle of identity operating in the self has a living, dynamic, assimilating power that it does not possess in the case of an artificial creation like an automobile.

If we make use not of the principle of abstract, but of concrete identity, of identity in the midst of the changes of experience, we can throw some light on that great objection to personality that a blow on the head or an anaesthetic blots out for the time conscious personality. Let us view personality not as an abstract, or mathematical identity, but as a purposive agent that has the power of organizing and co-ordinating the variations and acquisitions of experience and which bears an instrumental relationship to the various nervous and glandular systems. For a time there may be a break in the conscious phase of the subject, but not in personality itself. The violinist may lay aside his instrument, the violin, for a moment, but again he takes it up and brings forth from it wonderful strains. When he begins to play again, I never put into application

the principle of abstract identity and doubt whether he is the same violinist. In meeting these difficulties it is necessary to get the proper viewpoint and to make use of the right categories of thought. We need to remember that we are in the realm of personality and should make use of its own unique canons and categories. Let us not insist on importing the laws of mechanics or the abstract notions of logic into a consideration of the problems of the subject. Personality exists in its own right and has its own laws. To insist that the laws of mechanics or abstract logic must be used in dealing with personality is just as foolish as to take a fine watch to a blacksmith shop and demand that the smith mend it with his tools.

I have taken my stand on an analysis of experience. I have tried to make it plain that this consideration makes it evident that both a purposive agent and the nervous and glandular systems are necessary to rationalize experience. I am insisting that we do away with these false either-or's or disjunctions of thought, and substitute some helpful conjunctions. It is not either a mysterious subject or the nervous system, but a purposive agent acting thru that system. It is not the speaker at the microphone set over against the radio, but the speaker functioning thru the mechanics of the radio set. If my radio program is unsatisfactory to me, it may be the tubes, the condenser, the transformer or it may be that the speaker is inane. The quality of the program depends on both speaker and radio set. So it is with experience. It is a function not only of the glandular and nervous systems, but also of the purposive subject. I am insisting that this fact be faced frankly and scientifically. The relationship may be mysterious, but the quality of mystery has never been any bar to scientific

study. Let us do away with the unnatural and false antitheses—mind *or* matter, soul *or* body, purpose *or* natural law, personality *or* machine, architect *or* building materials, speaker at the microphone *or* sending station, and face the constructive conjunctions which realize the necessity for both of these apparently diverse elements in experience. Let us use *and* instead of *or*. Then our difficulties will not appear insuperable.

This instrumental view of personality as related to the various neurotic and glandular systems and as being independent of any localized nervous arc has been substantiated by certain experiments. Wiggam, in *Exploring Your Mind* (page 45), quotes from Thorndike the following facts that would point to the position we are advocating. Lashley has shown by taking out various parts of the brain cortex of a rat that there is no particular part of its cortex that is demanded to learn any particular thing. You can cut out almost any part of it and he can still learn. The older notion of an impulse coming into the brain and going along a little track, the afferent system, and causing another impulse to pass along another track, the efferent system, out from the brain to the muscles—this view is too simple to account for the facts. "Apparently there has to be some general control of the whole machine for any part of it to act properly." Such are some of the views of Thorndike.

Really the flow of experience demands this unifying, coordinating power of the ego. The stream of experience is not like a wild raging river at flood tide that has no direction or point. The various experiences are "My experiences." They have a warmth, a privacy and an intimacy about them that distinguish them from those of everybody else. Now, psychic possessions demand a possessor. They

cannot hang loose-jointed in the air. Experiences demand one who can experience them. All of my psychic acquisitions must be properly assimilated and co-ordinated and harmonized with the stock of my past experiences. That is the work of the ego. All of the flow of experience takes place on the background of personality. The stream of experience is not an aimless, purposeless affair. As Hickman well shows, in his *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (page 454), our various reactions and beliefs tend to arrange themselves around certain dominant centers, certain "hot" points of interest, such as prohibition, religion, and the League of Nations. The stream of experience must be properly integrated, co-ordinated and unified, or it has no meaning. Otherwise it would be like the Mississippi in days gone by when there were no levees in the south country, and it flowed where it would aimlessly over the bottoms. Every well-ordered mind will throw up the psychic levees and keep the flow of experience within certain bounds. I hope I have made it plain that even the normal flow of experience demands the unifying, purposive, co-ordinating work of the ego. I would dispose of the antithesis between a self which flows and the abiding identity of the personality by distinguishing between the real self which unifies, harmonizes and integrates experience, and its acquisitions which are constantly changing. Or adopting the distinction of other writers, I might say that the empirical self flows on and changes, while the transcendental or real self manifests a certain unity and sense of identity.

Personality is not a mere mosaic of instincts, conditioned reflexes or dynamic centers. The weakness of the hormic theory of McDougall is that his theory would tend to make

personality a mere collection of various instincts with their corresponding emotions that furnish the drive and purpose to life. He is working in the right direction in trying to emphasize purpose in life. But his ego is likely to be atomic, and to lack that cohesion and unity that a genuine personality demands.

Personality is not atomic, not a sort of loose-jointed collection of discrete, disparate elements in experience. There is a unique sense of individuality about my experiences that rescue them from atomism and discontinuities. Modern thought has insisted loudly that there must be no break, no hiatus, no discontinuity in experience. Now I claim that personality, and personality alone, can rescue the daily flux of life from the jump, skips and breaks that are so offensive to current thought.

Then, there is the additive notion of personality. Many modern writers would define the subject as the sum total of our habit systems and conditioned responses. But personality is no mere set of additions, no collection of habit systems, as Valentine insists. It is creative and unifying and dynamic. It is not a mere set of organizations. Organization demands an organizer, an executive. Michael Pupin speaks of the power of "Creative Co-ordination" and equates this with the soul of any object. This sense of integration and unification cannot be dispensed with in experience. Some thinkers essay to give the nervous system the power of co-ordination and unification. Really some writers seeming to realize the necessity of the attributes and work of the ego, have transferred this function of unification and harmony to the nervous system. They have tried to invest it with the attributes of personality. But Watson has again cleared the psychic atmosphere by protesting

against this undue emphasis on the function of the nervous system, and by insisting that it is not the nervous system alone but the whole bodily organism that responds to stimuli. That protest is clarifying. It is not scientific to deny the nature and role of personality and then to dress up the nervous system in the habiliments of the ego, and attempt to make it perform the roles of unifying, harmonizing and co-ordinating the discrete elements of experience. More and more it becomes evident that it must be some valid doctrine of personality or else behaviorism. There is no half-baked, compromise tenet between the two positions that is rational. Watson has well shown that all the objections which apply to a real doctrine of personality apply to these mediating, compromise theories of the self.

Bertrand Russell, in his *Philosophy* (page 247), holds that a person is not a single entity, but a series of events linked together by peculiar causal laws. All of the objections apply to this view that apply to any stream theory of the ego. There is lacking any sense of unity and co-ordination. I might further ask the question, "Who or what links together the various events?" Things in this life do not just get linked together in a rational series by the law of chance. Whether it be a string of freight cars or a series of psychic events that are to be hooked up, there is a directing and co-ordinating agent. Then, there is the matter of events? What is an occurrence? Surely it has no independent existence in its own right. I do not meet existences called "events" running loose on the street. They always concern other objects or persons. It takes automobiles, aeroplanes, big guns, battleships and people to bring about events. I do not know of any independent realm of existences called "events." Thus to say that per-

sonalities are made up of events does not solve our problems. We have next to determine the nature and constituents of these occurrences.

The gas-engine theory of personality of John Watson will not suffice. He holds in *Behaviorism* (page 216ff), that at a certain age we should take a cross-section of our various activities. If you catalogue everything that you can do into various systems of activity—the shoe-making, religious, marital, public speaking, fear, love and rage systems, the sum total of these is personality. Thus personality is built up out of these reaction systems as mechanically as a gas engine is constructed. But the self is assuredly not like a gas engine. It takes personality to devise and to build such an engine, and after it is built, it often takes personalities that are very efficient to keep it going, as most of us find to our sorrow and cost. A gas engine is a distinct creation of a subject. To take a tool or creation of man and try to build man himself and even the universe in that image is worse than anthropomorphism. It is what Streeter would style, “Mechanomorphism.” Isaiah (2:8) says that men worship the work of their own hands. In 44:16 he very graphically and satirically describes how a man will cut down a tree, and with the wood from it warm his hands, bake his food and finally build an image and fall down before it. This modern idolatry or worship of the abstractions of thought, or, worse still, of the creations of the hand of man, is very prevalent.

Next, I would consider the breaks and discontinuities of experience as seen in abnormal psychology. How shall we reconcile any static, unified notion of the self with the doctrines of the subconscious, unconscious, coconscious, multiple personality, etc? Surely there is a problem here.

Far be from me to claim that I can solve this vital question. First of all, I would state that we are largely in the realm of the abnormal, and that the bizarre and abnormal should never be made a test for normal life. There is today too much of a tendency to go to such abnormal fields and from the data there gathered to try to frame theories and hypotheses that shall be explicable of daily living.

In the next place, I would call in the testimony of the psycho-analytic psychology. This shows that most of the breaks in personality can be healed and that underlying the various discontinuities of consciousness there is an abiding unity that sooner or later asserts itself. It would seem that the breaks occur not in personality itself, but in the conscious phases of the self.

Let us note how a study of psycho-analysis furnishes such evidence for the unity of personality. In many cases of dissociation and multiple personality, the schism was healed by allowing one of the personalities to obtain control. It would seem that when the pendulum of the personality is free, it usually returns to a state of unity and individuality. Thus in the Freudian cures of hysteria there is the releasing of the hidden complex that lies buried in the unconscious mind. Then the mind returns after this monkey wrench is removed from the mental machinery to a state of unity and sanity. In a study of cases of multiple personality I find that sooner or later one of the egos gains and maintains the psychic ascendancy. Often beneath the various changes in personality there seems to abide an underlying stratum of personality that is conscious of the various stages. In the case of Mary Reynolds, after alternating in personality for years, she remained her secondary self. There is a final return to unity. In the case

of Félida of Bordeaux the secondary state gained command over the primary and there emerged a new woman. In the case of Madame B., after alternating between two personalities, when cast into a deeper state of hypnosis, a third personality appeared with higher qualities than the other two. Often there are upheavals and alternations of personality, so that what is below the surface of consciousness may for a time permanently rise above it. I am trying to make it plain that even in abnormal psychology there is a basic tendency to return to a state of unity and individuality. It would seem that the normal state from which departures are made and finally to which a return usually results is a unified, individualized ego. Morton Prince cured the celebrated case of Miss Beauchamp with her normal personality, the mischievous "Sally" and a third state, by merging the primary personality and the latest into a single well-rounded whole. For seven years "Sally" fought against her own extinction, but at the end of that time the fusion was complete. Thus there is a natural and ineradicable trend to unity and individuality in human experience. I would throw further light on the relation of abnormal psychology to personality by pointing out, as was held by Myers, that personality is at once extremely complex and expansive as well as profoundly unitary. It is never a static point of logical identity. It is a dynamic, purposive entity that gives unity and co-ordination to life.

So much of the psycho neuroses or minor abnormalities of life. As for psychosis or genuine insanity I do not think that much light can be found here on the subject of personality. Myerson, in the *Psychology of Mental Diseases*, holds that 8 to 10% of the mental diseases are due to alcohol. Syphilis causes about 10%. An organic change

in the arteries of the brain causes paresis. He suggests that a mental examination of statesmen might do more good than many peace conferences. In paranoia there arise notions of grandeur and persecution. In manic depressive psychosis there is a periodic change in mood from exaltation to extreme depression. Dementia precox starts early in life. Associated with it are hallucinations, delusions, a break down of memory and judgment, grotesque alterations of conduct, pathetic and horrible alienations from normal emotion and will. Frankly I do not think that much can be gleaned from a study of the psychoses. We are lost in the dark, gloomy realm of the insane. Myerson does say that just as so-called bodily experiences alter mind, so mental experiences change bodily structure. He holds that this conception of psychiatry is not to be called materialistic; it is organistic.

IV

Finally, I would note the objection that in order to establish a doctrine of personality, philosophy and even theology must be brought into play. I frankly admit that this is true. Empirical science cannot solve this problem. It has not the apparatus, the categories, the method of approach. But is it not better for psychology humbly to acknowledge that it has to pass the problem of the self over to philosophy and theology than blindly to try to deny the fact of personality, and hence to give us a truncated, pseudo-science of mechanistic psychology—one that is not true to the facts in the case. As the matter now stands, it is perhaps better that the problem of personality should be taken up in a volume separate and distinct from empirical

psychology. But I am insisting that it be taken up and that some platform be announced. No longer can psychologists keep silent on the issue. There is need for more works on psychological theory.

The important matter today in psychology is the platform. That should be enunciated. Every thinker has his platform of investigation. It would be conducive to clarity and honesty to make it plain at the beginning of the study. The purpose of this volume on "The Human Equation" is to serve as a proper introduction to a study of scientific psychology. I firmly believe that a separate and distinct consideration of the problem of personality is the most satisfactory manner to handle the subject.

I am trying to establish a doctrine that will be true to all the facts in the case. There have been too many interpretations of the lower levels of reality. Men have searched narrow segments that concerned the bizarre and the abnormal, and have deduced theories that are held to be determinative of the whole gamut of human experience. We need more of an emphasis on and study of the higher levels of living. We must study nervous reactions and the mentality of apes; but we must not overlook the great moral and religious reactions of the race. We must study endocrine glands and hormones; but we must not forget the great moral imperatives and religious sanctions that have played such a vital part in the history of the race. We must study life on the animal level, but we must also rise to the sublime heights of religion. We must consider common every-day life with its littleness and narrowness; but we must also examine the grand sacrificial deeds and noble ideals of the past. We must not neglect the men who have died for a cause, the martyrs of the faith. We

must listen to a Cyprian as describing the early Christian martyrs, he speaks of "The white-robed cohorts of Christ's soldiers" as "passing through footprints of glory to the embrace of Christ." We must hear him as, after his own sentence of death has been pronounced, he exclaims, "God be thanked." Such a fact is in the full orb of experience. Can it be explained by nervous reactions, endocrine glands or the stimulus-response equation alone? I think not. It takes the human equation to give us the right answer. Or what shall we say of the martyrs of science? There is Miss Mary Davies, the Welsh bacteriologist, who died in France a few weeks ago. She deliberately inoculated herself with gangrene germs to test a remedy for the terrible malady which killed thousands of soldiers during the early war days. Or there is Sir Henry Hind, the world's leading authority on Parkinson's disease, slowly dying in London, the victim of this mysterious creeping paralysis which he has tried for years to cure. Thru his own experience as a sufferer he is discovering new facts about the dread disease. Twenty years ago Sir Henry had the nerves of his left arm severed in order to study the problem of paralysis first hand. Such are some of the data on the sublime levels of life that are often neglected, but that absolutely demand the human equation.

CHAPTER V

PRACTICAL ANSWERS FROM THE HUMAN EQUATION



I HAVE attempted to show that the human equation is necessary to experience in order to make it rational. What answers does this equation make that are pertinent to every-day living? It is evident that the mechanistic formula in psychology is barren of results both for the sphere of speculation and for the field of practical endeavour. It is equally patent that any equation that rests upon abstractions and intellectualistic foundations is likewise arid. Are there any practical messages that a valid doctrine of personality would bring to our modern ears? I believe that belief in personality is just as necessary to the realm of practical thought as it is to a sane psychology. It is because our modern civilization has departed from the tenets and teachings of personality and has attempted to follow mechanistic equations that many of the ills of our day have ensued. In our national life we need a return to personality—its categories and its corollaries. Let us note some of the messages that a valid doctrine of personality would bring to our work-a-day world.

I

At the outset I would note that a belief in personality is a spiritual attainment. In the last analysis, personality itself is a spiritual existence. Perhaps during the discussion there have been surging thru the reader's mind thoughts

somewhat as follows, "If personality is not a mere abstraction of thought, if it is not an attenuated ethereal substance that is only a disguised materialism, subject to the same laws of determinism to which matter is amenable, then, pray, what is its nature? Surely it must have some real existence." My reply is that personality belongs to the realm of spiritual existences. Most of us realize that there is a spiritual order in the universe and that this order influences our daily experience. To this realm belong the great values of life which the race has accumulated at a great sacrifice. The moral codes, patriotism, religion have contributed to the formation of such values as justice, truth, beauty, fortitude, courage. These values have exerted a powerful influence on the history of the race. Even the strict evolutionist must take account of their influence in any theory of progress. These values belong to the spiritual order. They cannot be weighed or measured. They are rooted and grounded, not in any philosophy of idealism, but in personality.

We are pleading for a recognition of this spiritual order. There are other levels of reality beside naturalism with its categories of mechanism. The spiritual realm has asserted its autonomy. It is no longer a mere province under the absolute sway of mechanism. It exists in its own right, and has its own unique categories. It has asserted its declaration of independence. It clarifies the issue to make it plain that personality belongs to the spiritual and not the material order, however finely attenuated that realm may become. You may spin out and etherealize material entities to the nth degree, but they are still mechanistic in nature and still subject to the same laws of absolute determinism. Hence all modern efforts to show that mat-

ter or the ether may be so refined and spiritualized that it may serve as a substratum for personality are failures. This spiritual order exists in its own right; asks neither apologies nor favours of the mechanistic level of existence; and has its own unique categories and canons of judgment. To this spiritual realm, where God, freedom and immortality and all the great values of the race have their existence, I assign personality. Personality is an ultimate in the study of psychology and philosophy. In all our investigations and thinking we sooner or later come upon some great basic assumption, some ultimate or "type-phenomenon." It may be the electron, the law of relativity, the law of association, or the conditioned reflex. Every investigator at some point posits that hypothesis which would make his system rational. I have tried to set forth personality as that hypothesis which best explains and rationalizes all of the facts of psychology and daily living. The whole argument of my book has tended to show that this spiritual ultimate is no mere idle spectator on the side lines of life, no lazy dweller in the empyrean of pure essence, but an active, purposive, directing agent in the hurly-burly of daily existence.

If personality is spiritual in its nature, then the apprehension of it is a spiritual attainment. I have tried to make it plain that experience demands the self, and that the hypothesis of a subject best explains all the facts of daily living, of psychology and of philosophy. But I would never claim that the existence of personality, with its sense of unity, identity and individuality, could be demonstrated like a theorem in mathematics. There is nothing axiomatic about a spiritual personality. If you elect to doubt it and to stand on the platform of behaviorism, I could never club

you into orthodoxy with a set of self-evident propositions. At the last, there is the leap of faith, the adventure of belief. The tenet is surely not contrary to reason and experience—yea, it tends to make experience rational. But like all ultimate realities, such as God, freedom and immortality, it demands faith for its final verification. It is the best hypothesis to explain all the facts in the case, and yet an hypothesis that demands not a whit more exercise of faith than does the acceptance of the theory that tables and chairs are composed of electrons and protons that jazz about continually. It conduces to clarity, if it is recognized frankly that the fact of personality cannot be made logically and mathematically clear but that it demands an act of faith. Because the ego is substantially spiritual and because it demands this exercise of faith are reasons why this mechanistic age has largely lost the sense of personality. To paraphrase Corinthians 2:14, "But this age of naturalism receiveth not the things of personality; for they are foolishness unto it; neither indeed can it know them with test tubes, intelligence tests, and mere psychological equations alone, for they are spiritually discerned." John B. Watson has caught the point when he claims that all psychologies that are postulated on consciousness, introspection, or purpose are religious in nature. Because he is not willing to embark on this venture of faith, he eschews all of them, and develops a one-sided psychology of pure objectivity.

While each of us is a personality, in the last analysis the facts of unity and integration on which personality is postulated are subject to development. There is such a thing as the attainment of a clearer sense of personality. We are not all integrated and co-ordinated in the same de-

gree. Some persons are like the United States Government. There is a strong central government, with personality at the head that holds in proper co-ordination all the diverse passions, instincts and aims of our being and guides with a strong hand the psychic republic to a purposeful goal. Others are like the state of Mexico. Personality is at the helm, but it has never succeeded in bringing all the rebellious provinces of temper, worry and discord into a proper harmony. Sometimes a province of our being becomes so rebellious that it threatens to secede, and to set up a state of dissociation. The more I am integrated and co-ordinated and the stronger the central subject, the better is my attainment of the complete rule of personality. But this attainment is a costly affair. Hocking well shows, in *Human Nature in Its Remaking*, that we are prone to cast down the totality that the fragment may be free. As he says, every destruction of unity has its exhilaration, every repudiation of debt gives radical relief and sends the blood pulsing. Maintaining a self is a costly and burdensome program. Every time I lose my temper or give way to needless worry, I am striking a blow at the sense of integration and co-ordination. When I try to crank my old Ford car and it kicks back and I lose my temper, what really happens is the creation of a complex like this, "I hate this horrid old car. I would like to burn it up!" Such an unruly complex for the time being drives the central ego away from control and rules with a rebel hand. Of course, the personality soon comes back to the capital and takes up the reigns of government, else I would lapse into an abnormal state of dissociation.

This attainment of personality, with its attendant power, poise and peace is one of the great missions of religion.

When the city states of Greece were falling before the onslaughts of Alexander the Great, a man by the name of Zeno had the vision that the real ego could be independent of all these colossal destructions, and that its inner citadels were impregnable. During the chaotic political conditions of several centuries in Greece and Rome, many a noble soul held on to this sublime truth that personality is independent of circumstance and can rule as a sovereign in its own right. Stoicism caught the vision of the possibility of the autonomous rule of the ego, but it lacked the dynamic to carry out its sublime program. It remained for One to come later, who said, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Again He said, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."

II

The next answer from the personal equation is a negative one. It consists in pointing out certain obstacles that now militate against the development of personality.

The first is the Materialism of the hour. This is an old, old story, but because of its vital importance to the subject in hand, it will bear repetition. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there was a great liberation of personality. The Renaissance took off the shackles of superstition and ecclesiasticism, so that man in the classics and in science could carry on a free investigation, untrammelled by dogma or churchly bias. The Reformation gave personality its religious freedom. It tore down the priestly accretions and man-made approaches to God, and taught that religion is

a direct access of the human spirit to Him thru faith alone. After man had gained his freedom, his greatest advances and explorations have been made in the objective world of science. The outer world has been developed in a marvelous fashion. Personality has proceeded to conquer nature in a remarkable manner. Especially has man been successful in building helpful tools that would minister to his own bodily comfort and ease. He no longer has to carry the butter and milk to the spring house or even bring in the ice; but he installs a frigidaire or other electric refrigeration and his troubles are over. He no longer goes out with his axe and cuts wood or even carries in the coal; but he installs an oil-o-matic burner that is regulated by a thermostat and his heat troubles are solved. We say, "How wonderful are these modern facilities!" But consider that little word, "facility." It literally means "To make easy." It signifies that all the obstacles are being removed and the rough places smoothed down, and that soon no effort or sacrifice or labour on the part of man will be necessary. The truth is that unless man can find some substitute realms that demand labour and toil, our modern facilities are in grave danger of breeding a race of mollicoddles and weaklings. It takes effort and struggle and toil to develop personality, and our machine age is doing all it can to get rid of every vestige of roughness and effort. It is no wonder the doctrine of personality comes hard today. This naturalistic age is doing all it can to destroy it. Behaviorism is the inevitable, logical and official psychology of a machine age. If tools and machines are regnant everywhere else, why not in psychology? But it is well to remember that it takes personality to create tools. Only a purposive subject could ever have developed our remarkable facili-

ties of the hour. Furthermore, it not only takes the ego to create, but also requires the subject to enjoy to the fullest the benefits of our modern facilities. We must not only invent the radio, but must also have personality enough to devise programs to be broadcasted that rise above the silly jazz and inane recitations that sometimes are sent forth on the air. If we lose personality in this twentieth century, we are not equipped to enjoy or to make a proper use of the facilities which the spiritual ego created.

Since the sixteenth century our advance has been one-sided and disproportionate. We have advanced further in the outer world than we have in the inner sphere of living. The world is still waiting for a proportionate advance to be made in the realm of the spirit. The subjective world needs to catch up with the objective. We are so immersed in the stream of this materialistic age that we hardly realize, until we look into the matter, how thoroughly mechanistic all our standards are. Of course, all the standards of business, commerce and industrialism are naturalistic to the core. We would largely expect that condition. Politicians often pride themselves on being utterly opposed to all ideals and moral sanctions. Our standards of success are mechanistic. It is surprising how the Church of the living God has adopted these same standards of big business and industrial efficiency. I meet a brother preacher, and ask him what kind of a year he has had in the church. His reply is likely to be somewhat as follows, "Oh, I have had a good year. I have raised \$10,000 for benevolences, I have paid off the church debt. I have put in a pipe organ. I have co-operated with all the financial drives in the Synod. I have brought my quota of fifty folks into the church." This answer of the average man is mechanistic

to the core. It is the application of business efficiency to the church. The more subtle and intangible things of the Spirit—growth in grace, development in prayer life, the destruction of prejudice and passion, a zeal for real witnessing for Jesus in all the relationships of life—such facts are conspicuous by their absence from many conventional church discussions.

Another obstacle to the proper development of personality is Standardization. This follows from the fact that we are living in a machine age. In such a time a good tool is of more value than a well-rounded personality. In fact, the latter may be more of a liability than an asset, for it refuses to conform or stay "put" to mechanistic standards. The unique contribution of America to world thought has been standardization. This has made possible mass production of all articles from automobiles to clothes. It has lowered the cost of production. It has made it possible to bring at a low cost the facilities of life to the masses. But standardization is an obstacle to the development of real personality. The ideal of our industrial age is more and more to find clever machines that will enable it to dispense with the personal equation. The more personality can be eliminated the better. A few men are needed to turn a lever now and then. The human equation is evaporated into the mechanistic formula. Man has become only a cog in a wheel of the machine.

Shall man be engulfed by the machine which he has created? In time shall we dispense with the human equation entirely and turn the universe over to mechanism? This is becoming a vital problem. The vitaphone is taking the place of the individual musician. The cotton picker will banish the personal equation from the cotton fields.

Labour-saving devices all tend to drive the personal factor from business. The next war may be between the giant machine and the poor man who made it. Prof. Walter B. Pitkin, in his book, *The Twilight of the American Mind*, takes the same position that I have advanced. He says that there is a double-barreled proposition which underlies our money and profit system. Here it is: "Give as much work as possible to machines and to system. Give as little as possible to men. Never give to any man work which another man of less ability can do equally well, so far as the finished product is concerned." What is a sane attitude to adopt towards this rising tide of mechanism? It is not the "defeatist" attitude that would do away with the machine and all its works—with hygiene, sanitation, the great modern inventions and conveniences. Humanity does not want to go back to a state of nature. It will not follow Rousseau in his contention on this point. Surely it does not conduce to deep thinking and lofty meditation and a real exploration of the soul to be in abject squalor surrounded by filth and disease germs. America need not go back to the material civilization of India in order to save her national soul.

Then there is the Babbitt, Main-Street attitude, which uncritically accepts mechanism and all its fruits as the highest entity in the universe. Prosperity, a "bull" stock market, high commodity prices are the supreme existences on earth and must not be disturbed. All moral, aesthetic and religious demands must be subordinated to the machine. The man in this camp needs to be asked the solemn question, "What shall it profit an age if it gain the whole world of business, finance and commerce, and lose its own soul?"

The true answer to this problem must come from the human equation. Really the advent of the machine represents the triumph of personality over nature. Its coming has liberated the soul of man from many physical adjustments and material subordinations to nature and should give him more time for spiritual exploration. It all depends on whether man is victimized by the machine or victorious over it. Really it comes down, in the last analysis, to the question of how he will use the leisure which the age of mechanism has brought him. If he spends all his time bowing down before the idols of materialism and epicureanism in the temple of Naturalism, then he will become a more abject slave than ever to the machine, the child of his brain. But if he uses his new freedom, first of all, to find his own soul, and then for a new exploration into its psychic depths, the coming of the machine will have been a boon. It all depends on whether personality prevails or is swallowed up by the octopus.

Until you look at the matter, you will be surprised to note how completely the notion of standardization has conquered all the realms of human experience. Take the matter of the daily newspaper. The old days, when you could turn to the editorials of Horace Greeley or Henry Watter-son and get some journalistic "kick" from a perusal of an article that was shot thru and thru with personality, are gone. Instead we have our great dailies that are run primarily for the sake of the advertisements. Seldom do we know who writes the editorials. Most of the feature stories are standardized writings that appear in two dozen dailies on the same day. Many of these papers exhale the commonplace, bromidic, standardized notions of expediency, party loyalty and crass materialism that are charac-

teristic of the hour. Consider the radio programs. A few years ago I turned on my radio and heard Bill Jones and Susie Smith sing their duet from Poplar Center. But those days of individuality in radio performance are gone, much to the delight of many of the listeners, I suspect. Instead, we have great standardized programs from New York that are financed by General Motors or the Great A. & P. Tea Co. Standardization has improved the quality of the programs. But there lurks a subtle danger to personality in the possibility that a few people can control at the present time most of the avenues of radio discharge.

Major Povah, in his *Old Testament and Modern Problems in Psychology* (page 13), shows how our very thinking follows the cinematographic method and gives us only a few of the standard photographs of experience. He claims that the Hebrew language remedies this defect. While in most languages the stepping stones are numerous and the author jumps from one to the other, in classic Hebrew the stepping stones are less numerous and the author swims from one to the other, along and in the stream. Because of its bias towards the imaginative and the personal, the Hebrew language well reproduces real experience. To remedy this standardization of thought in all departments of human activity—philosophy, theology and religion—we need to apply less of the mechanical and more of the personal categories to our great problem. We do not need to stretch personality on the procrustean bed of standardization until it is made to fit all our commonplace notions and ideals. But we do need to study personality; to develop the worth-while uniqueness and even idiosyncrasies that make up real individuality, and to apply these principles to our daily problems.

The final obstacle that I shall note is Propaganda. This is often the method of education that our mechanistic, standardized age uses. The press and the public schools must disseminate only those truths that harmonize with the tenets of mechanism. That was a startling revelation that the Director of the Tennessee Public Service Information Bureau made when he said that the policy of the great utilities was to pat the newspapers of the country on the back. Even more shocking is the disclosure of how this same utility trust has tried to influence the writers of school textbooks to teach only those truths that are friendly to their business. This is propaganda at its worst. When we realize that twenty companies control 83% of the production of electricity in our country, we see what a great power for evil lurks in such a program. When the virus of propaganda gets into education, it is truly in a moribund state. Then the spirit of free investigation—yea, of truth itself—dies.

The psychology of propaganda is interesting. The wise propagandist usually appeals to the great racial instincts, passions and prejudices that lie buried in the depths of our personalities. Major Povah makes the interesting suggestion that the false prophet is telling the people only the prejudices and hatreds and narrowness that their own collective unconscious mind has suggested to him. Thus false prophet and audience form a vicious psychical circle. He is rendering vocal what lies buried and unexpressed in the unconscious minds of the people. In applauding the false prophet they are only applauding themselves. I believe this is largely true. The jingoist who, on the fourth of July, in flamboyant phrase tells the people that their country is the greatest in the world and can whip every

other nation, is only making vocal the prejudices that lie buried in the depths of their minds. The politician, who fans the flames of partisanship and tells the people that the Democratic or Republican party is the greatest and noblest body on earth, is only telling the people what they really think but cannot say. The labour agitator, who stirs up the class prejudices of the crowd, is only bringing to the surface the bitterness and narrowness that the crowd really believes and wants to hear. He is just feeding back to them their own unconscious prejudices and provincialism. Even in religion the false prophet pats the people on the back morally, tells them that they have the only form of baptism, the only form of church government, the only rational creed, and that the whole world can be saved only by coming to them. The crowd shouts, "Amen," not because it hears what it ought to hear but what it wants to hear. Thus most propaganda is predicated on racial instincts and prejudices. I have not heard of much propaganda being exercised for righteousness and spiritual values. The true prophet, who heralds forth not what the collective unconscious of the race dictates, but what God inspires, the kind of a personality is not "amened," but crucified.

Another characteristic of propaganda is repetition. The wise propagandist just keeps on repeating the truth until you can hardly help believing it. This underlies the psychology of advertising. I read in the magazine of a wonderful new razor. I am interested, but pass on in my reading. I read the same ad next week, and I stop and investigate. I read that same ad for several weeks and finally I am worked up to the point that I believe that my physical and social heritage will be jeopardized if I

do not rush down to the drug store and purchase that razor before night ere they are all sold out. I have fallen for propaganda. If you can just get a crowd to repeating some slogan, whether in a mob that is being incited to lynch a man, or in a whole nation that is being worked up to a state of war hysteria, or even in a religious controversy where party labels and shibboleths are being bandied back and forth; if you can carry on the constant repetition far enough, you will soon have that audience believing what you want them to accept. The basis of this is that where afferent and efferent nerves are constantly and repeatedly linked, you will soon have great habit systems formed. The old psychologies used to speak of paths cut in the brain. But it is not so much a path cut by a nervous current like the water that trickles over a levee and ever cuts a deeper rut, as it is the constant linkage that tends to form habit systems. Here is the partial truth in behaviorism with its great habit systems—manual, visceral and laryngeal. It is the half truth in the James-Lange theory of the emotions, viz., that the physical accompaniments of any feeling tend to increase the intensity of the emotion. If I can keep from making any bodily or vocal demonstration, I can largely control my temper. If I keep on shouting a slogan at the top of my voice, I will sooner or later believe it. Constant repetition plays a large part in propaganda. This is true of the orator trying to stir up the crowd to go to war, of the newspaper that is endeavouring to stir up partisanship in politics, and of the religious bigot who would stir up religious prejudice. Cato was a wise propagandist when he closed every speech in the senate with the words, *Carthago delenda est*. He finally carried his point, as most propagandists do.

Now this spirit is fatal to the operation of real personality. In fact, the demagogue, even with his psychological tricks, cannot sway a crowd made up of real personalities who do their own thinking. The success of propaganda depends largely on keeping the personal equation at a minimum. The wise propagandist must have people of little personality, who are susceptible to crowd emotions and mass thinking. But our age needs less of this spirit of propaganda and more of the application of real personality to our problems. We need less mass and more directive thinking. We need fewer parrots and more creators. We need fewer demagogues and more dynamic personalities. We need fewer false prophets and more genuine prophets of the Most High. We need to bring all our problems to the human equation for their solution.

III

In the last place, I want to note just what it means to apply the personal equation to our present problems. In this discussion I do not want to dwell in the clouds. In practical terms what answer does the human equation give to our every day needs? Behaviorism, with its intelligence tests, and the dynamic psychology, with its emphasis on the human drives and vital interests, have made notable contributions to practical living. I firmly believe that the human equation has answers for our age which are just as practical and useful as are any ever given by the other psychological theories. I would note these.

The first message is a new emphasis on real Ideas. For a long time thinking has fallen into disrepute in psychology. It has largely been equated with rationalization,

which means that in our intellectual efforts we are not seeking for real causes, but only for cloaks that will hide our hidden prejudices, partisanships and concealed will-to-believe. Surely if all our investigations and interpretations are not for the purpose of finding new truth at any cost, but only for the purpose of fortifying our prejudices and bolstering up our superstitions, then the outlook for the improvement of the race is hopeless. If my only reason for reading the *Literary Digest* is not to discover the truth of things, but to gather up evidence that will strengthen the hot centers of my political life, such as prohibition, the League of Nations, the tariff, then it is evident that my intellectual efforts are largely in vain. If I read my Bible, not to find the truth that will make me free, but only to strengthen my prejudices, then my religious thinking is hardly worthy of the name. Undoubtedly there is much thinking that is only rationalization. But the human equation answers that not *all* intellectual effort is of this low order, else the race would never have made any progress out of superstition and ignorance. One definite answer that the human equation gives to our practical living is that real constructive and directive thinking needs to be developed as never before.

A new emphasis on personality means that all the idols of thought must go. Major Povah, in *The Old Testament and Modern Problems in Psychology* (page 105), has stated admirably the psychology of idolatry. He says that it was difficult for the human spirit to believe that the Lord's demands had reference to the whole of man and to every aspect of life. Hence idolatry arose. It is the confining of Jehovah's presence to only a portion of the world, and it thus implies the relegating of His demands to a

portion of life. If Jehovah be not geographically ubiquitous, His demands cannot be psychologically ubiquitous; they cannot apply to every province of life. Idolatry is just the denial that the Lord rules the whole domain of life, and it is the easiest method for confining His influence to only a certain sphere of human activity. Today great idols of thought have been constructed. The naturalist has surveyed the contour of the land, and, like Jeroboam of old, in order to keep the people from visiting the sanctuaries of real personality at Jerusalem, he has constructed two golden calves. At Dan he has builded the golden calf of mechanism; and at Bethel he has erected the calf of empty abstractions. The mission of real thought is to destroy both of these idols, and to lead the human spirit back to the altar at Jerusalem, where it can find its own personality and worship the Great Divine Personality back of the universe. The votaries of the golden calf of mechanism have much to say about the laws of mechanical causation and determinism, and about objectivity in psychology. The worshippers at Bethel have invented many high-sounding philosophical phrases, and would attempt to deify and reify many terms, such as the uniformity of natural law, evolution, nationalism, humanity, the categories of thought, etc.

This worship of abstractions is common to us all. The great crusade on which real thought should embark is to demolish these and to lead humanity back to the old sanctuary of personality at Jerusalem. It would enter the camp of Liberal and Conservative alike and demolish its idols. On the Liberal side it would destroy the idols that are consecrated to the uniformity of natural law, to naturalistic evolution as a philosophic principle. It would

search our Conservative camp to see if there are not some golden calves erected, not to a sane defence of what the Bible claims for itself, but to glorify some private deduction, some personal interpretation of Scripture, some mere theological abstraction which the pious defender of the faith has built into an idol. The great mission of the preacher is to be a prophet who proclaims against idols of all kinds. When the minister loses the prophetic fire from his bosom, and degenerates into a mere "patter of backs," or an ecclesiastical politician, or a church organizer, or a semi-political inciter of passion and prejudice, then it is well for him to look within his own soul and see if he has not lost the call to preach. Says John E. Edgerton, President of the National Association of Manufacturers, "The pulpit needs to be lifted above the sordid mass thinking of the crowd, and not lowered compromisingly to the levels of street discussion."

A second great message from the human equation to our practical world is the need for cultivating proper Sentiments. A sentiment is a certain system of emotions surrounding a given object. In the sphere of patriotism it has to do with the association of patriotic feelings that cluster about the flag of our country. In the realm of religion it is concerned with the whole set of religious emotions that have been woven about some great ceremonial like the Lord's Supper or Baptism. In the case of politics it is the whole system of partisan feelings that have been built about the symbols of the party, the elephant or the donkey. Now the sentiments of the race are very important, and have played a large part in the development of civilization. They have to do with the emotional life of man, just as ideas have to do with his thinking. It is very es-

sential that a proper education should take place in the sphere of the sentiments. A traveler goes to the Invalides in Paris to see the tomb of the great Napoleon. It is a most impressive sight. Above him rises the great dome of the Invalides. Down at the bottom on a stupendous shaft rests the magnificent red marble casket that contains the remains of the man of destiny. Close by are buried his two best friends, Duroc and Bertrand. In a circle about the tomb are the battleflags of many a great victory; while inscriptions commemorative of other battles are carved here and there. It is a wonderful tribute to a great warrior. The whole air is redolent with the spirit of conquest and blood and war. As you raise your eyes from the red granite tomb of Napoleon, you see towering above the whole scene, and seeming to dominate it, the figure of the crucified Christ. You are surprised. You are struck with the incongruity of the whole scene. This is no place for the Prince of Peace in this martial atmosphere permeated with the spirit of Marengo and Austerlitz! But there it stands, a peaceful figure of the crucified Christ, dominating this pile, erected to war and blood. That, it seems to me, is a parable of the history of the war sentiments of the race. We have taken war and tried to idealize it and glorify it and have even tried to Christianize it. The answer of the human equation is just this: "You must tear away the garments of respectability and idealism and religion that you have tried to drape about the ugly figure of war, and reveal it in all its naked realism and brutality and savagery. You must take the figure of the Gentle Christ out of the museums erected to wars. He does not belong there. This is one great step in the education of the war sentiments of the race." Such is the line along which the sentiments

of mankind must be cultured. I am glad that great progress is being made in a proper culture of the patriotic emotions. The great treaties against war, the agitation for a reduction of needless armaments—all this indicates that the race is moving forward in its development of patriotic sentiments. The feeling of patriotism is a noble one, and should by no means be destroyed. But it should be sublimated from a mere expression of jingoism and militarism to a love of country that consists in respect for and obedience to the constitution and all the laws of the land; and in a determination to make our country first in moral and spiritual leadership as well as in mere economic and material efficiency. The same kind of culture of the sentiments must take place in the sphere of politics. Party loyalty must not be erected into a mighty idol that demands that her votaries should sacrifice every conviction, every distinction between right and wrong, every true principle of government to her service. Even the religious sentiments of the race demand proper education. They need to be personalized and rationalized. Often they are shot thru and thru with narrowness, bitterness and prejudice. Once at a meeting of Presbytery far out in the country I heard a country preacher approach a friend of mine and ask him to hold a protracted meeting for him. The conversation ran somewhat as follows: "A rival denomination has just had a fire-eating evangelist in our community who has preached incessantly on baptism, and who has 'kicked' unmercifully all those who did not agree with him. He stirred up all kinds of religious prejudice, and for the time being has put our denomination on the defensive. We want you to come and hold a meeting to offset his. We do not want a sweet, tame and spiritual

affair. We want you to fight him back in the same manner, and to try to restore our prestige in the eyes of the rest of the community." Now, it is evident to all that such a religious sentiment needs much cultivation before it is even worthy of the adjective, "religious." Such is the laudable work to which the human equation calls us.

A third answer from the human equation to the problems of the race is a demand for proper Ideals. Ideals are the ends that true education holds before the will, just as proper sentiments are for the emotions and true ideas for the mind. In our education of the entire personality let us not neglect the culture of ideals. In these days ideals are not in very high repute. After the war, in the rejection of Wilsonism and all for which he stood in politics, there was a reaction against all kinds of ideals. The race seemed to be "fed up" on ideals. Even party platforms tried to make capital out of a derision of and rejection of all high ends of conduct. Expediency and selfishness and materialism and epicureanism were glorified. Among the young of our land, ideals were not well received. To this hard-boiled, utilitarian, money-loving age they had the ring of maudlin sentimentality. Says a write in *The Nation's Schools*: "If anyone ventures to talk about idealistic things in most of our colleges today, the sophisticated students tend to close up on him and dismiss the matter by calling it 'applesauce.' We are certainly entering, if we are not already in, an age of cynicism regarding idealistic conceptions of human nature, and the objectives of human life." The human equation makes answer that the ideals must not go. What shall be the great ends of life? Shall it be one of the great urges of the race—food, self or sex? If the ideals are politely bowed off the stage of human activity,

and the great innate instincts are made supreme as driving powers, then sooner or later civilization will be led into another blind alley. The *reductio ad absurdum* of economic materialism and epicureanism was the battlefield of Flanders and Picardy. It would seem that the race should have learned the lesson that the mere instincts of the self, of the herd and of sex will not suffice as worthy ends of human conduct. A valid doctrine of personality insists that the race needs ideals to lead it out of the morass of savagery and bitterness and militarism to the heights of the real liberty of sons of God.

What are valid ideals for the human personality? I believe they are found only in the moral and spiritual ends set forth by Jesus of Nazareth. He taught that, to find his real personality, man must lose it. His teachings are against the present philosophy of self-indulgence, self-realization, and utter freedom from inhibitions of all kinds. He would teach us today that the way to achieve a real personality is not to surrender to all the lower instincts and passions, but to inhibit some, and sublimate others to higher ends and purposes. He would tell us today that, if a man would really attain to personality, he must be willing to lose himself in His service and in doing the Will of God. That is the truth pathway to self-realization. This is the ideal that will save the world. In the *Union Seminary Review* for October, 1927, Ghandi thus describes European civilization as having "raised selfishness to a religious creed, mammon to the throne of God, and falsehood to a fine art. It has created artificial wants for man and made him the slave of work to satisfy them. He knows no peace. It has made him little more than a breathing, fighting, hustling, spinning machine." What is to be the remedy? It is to be

found only in a new presentation to the world by precept and example of the moral and spiritual ideals of Jesus Christ. I am wondering if the Christian church, in its passion for religious argumentation and controversy and in its bias to a purely intellectualistic interpretation of Christianity, has done full justice to a presentation of and emphasis on the ideals of Jesus.

A fourth practical message from the human equation is that the moral imperatives be accentuated. This is no place for a technical discussion of ethics. But I do insist that true personality demands a realm of morals. This exists in its own rights with its own canons. It stubbornly resists being reduced to the lower categories of mechanism or utility. Twentieth century thought cannot put in the crucible hedonism, utilitarianism and epicureanism, and by mixing them together, bring forth the concepts of the right. Real morality cannot have any naturalistic origin. It exists in its own right, and does not ask any favour or defence from lower categories. The order of moral imperatives is just as truly a level of reality as the sphere of art. Real personality demands the existence and potency of this unique moral order with its own ethical sanctions. It takes such a moral atmosphere for personality to function in the highest degree.

The real attack today is against the existence of any moral order whatever. Many popular novelists, in a most cynical manner, are attempting to bring the moral sanctions into disrepute. Goodness and truth and honour do not exist in their own right, they argue. The real battle today is not about the redoubts that defend even such vital truths as the Virgin Birth or the Incarnation, but in front of the last line of trenches that defend the very existence

of any moral order at all. If the only level of reality we known has to do with pure expediency and utility and epicureanism, and there is no real moral imperative at all, then the dogmatic theologian and the apologist had just as well call in the colours and beat a safe retreat. There is a clarion call today for a new defence of the sanctity of moral imperatives. Against the *New Hedonism* of the New Realism, the *Scientific Ethics* of Bertrand Russell, the *Developmental Ethics* of Naturalism and the *Experimental Morals* of Watson, there needs to be a clear-cut statement of the *New Intuitionism*. This should proclaim that the conscience does not give us in an *a priori* manner the decision in every moral alternative. That is the function of the moral judgment. But it should herald forth in no uncertain terms that conscience does recognize a unique moral order with peculiar sanctions, and that these exist in their own right, with their own categories, and cannot be reduced to the lower canons of utility and mere pleasure. Hickman, in his *Psychology of Religion*, is on the right track when he insists that in all acts of moral discernment there are certain ethical-forms that are innate, the contribution of the subject itself.

The final message of the human equation is that personality can come to its highest fruition only when nurtured by the Christian religion. Looked at from one standpoint, the whole purpose and plan of this great religion is to free the human personality from the drag of sin thru Jesus Christ; and to make it realize that, as redeemed, it is immortal *here and now*, free and triumphant over the passing vicissitudes, disappointments and heartaches of life. But the world is too much with us. We become so immersed in the passing events of this work-a-day world, its

ups and downs, its bargainings and sellings, its sunshine and rain, that we soon foolishly imagine that we are part and parcel of the naturalistic order. To change our figure, we walk so much out in the lights of the garish day that our eyes become blinded, so that they can no longer discern the finer shades and nuances of reality that betoken the presence of our personality. Says Wordsworth, in describing the world's attempts to make the child forget the realities and glories of religion:

Earth fills her lap with pleasures of her own;
Yearnings she hath in her own natural kind,
And, even with something of a mother's mind,
And no unworthy aim,
The homely nurse doth all she can
To make her foster-child, her innate man
Forget the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.

Yes, there are times when we need to steal away from the noise, grind and dirt of this mechanistic old age and try to get a new grip on ourselves, and thus find our own personalities. Then some glorious day we may discover that there is something about us *here and now* that is eternal and immortal; that defies the passing changes and vicissitudes of life, even the decay of our bodies, the temporary tenement of personality, and that will finally conquer death itself. Such an apprehension of personality is an epochal occasion in any life.

One day in Geneva, Switzerland, I stole away from the noisy crowd of sight seers, and went into the old Cathedral of St. Peters, sacred to the memory of John Calvin. There were few visitors in the historic old building. I took a seat

near the front, and taking out my worn pocket Testament, I read Romans 8:35-39. Here I was almost alone in the seat of historic Calvinism. The cathedral was without ornamentation, austere and sublime in its simplicity, the very embodiment of the man John Calvin. Just in front of me was Calvin's own chair. Close by to my left was the very pulpit from which he and Knox had thundered their theological and moral warnings at the Libertines of Geneva. In this temple, sacred to the memory of one who laboured to free human personality from the shackles of ecclesiasticism and superstition, and to ground it for time and eternity on the plans and purposes of the Divine personality itself, I opened my Bible and read the very platform and Magna Charta of Calvinism: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation or distress or persecution, or famine or nakedness, or peril or sword?—nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors thru Him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." I closed the book, and there flooded my soul, as never before, a realization of the abiding nature and immortality of my own personality, and its ability thru Christ to defy all the passing changes of this old world. St. Paul had led me into the very Holy of Holies of divine truth, and I had found, not only my Saviour, but myself. When Paul wrote these sublime words I am sure that two, and only two, facts stood out clearly in his own consciousness: one was the eternity of his own soul, the other the love of Christ. For a time he must have forgotten Corinth, its wickedness, his pressing and heart-

breaking pastoral duties and the dangers that awaited him. I think he must have stopped for a while in his writing of the celebrated epistle. A gentle breeze from Heaven itself was wafted into his soul, and carried for a time the little bark of his faith past the dangerous rocks of earthly vicissitudes and the reefs of bodily dissolution to the very Haven of Peace.

David Smith tells us that when Robert Bruce, the Scottish Saint, lay dying he suddenly called to his daughter, "Hold, daughter, my Master calls me." And then he bade her fetch the Bible. "Cast me up," he said, "the eighth chapter of Romans, and place my finger on these words, 'I am persuaded'." Thus he died with his finger and his faith grounded on eternal realities.

APPENDIX I

PREVAILING PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

*With Special Attention to Their Bearing
on Personality*



1. BEHAVIORISM

This is psychology of pure objectivity. Bodily movement is response to stimuli. These movements can be stated in the celebrated equation, (U.) S.—(U.) R., which means that an unconditioned stimulus leads to an unconditioned response. In experience this may be changed to (C.) S.—(C.) R., which means that a conditioned stimulus leads to a conditioned response.

Thinking is subvocal talking or implicit language habit. An emotion is a hereditary pattern reaction involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole and particularly of the visceral and glandular systems. Based largely on a study of the infant. There are no instincts, mind, or consciousness. Reduces science to an objective science or anthroponomy. It is not new (save in form) but goes back to Democritus, Descartes, Spencer, Bethe, Loeb, Pavlow, etc. There are in general three parties: *Strict Behaviorists* (Watson); *Purposive Behaviorists* (Tolman); *Near Behaviorists* (Allport).

Criticism: It neglects introspection, or a study of the inner life. It reduces psychology to physiology. Eliminates purpose, and is deterministic, but, with a striking incon-

sistency, it introduces purposive elements of mind into its investigations and interpretations. No valid doctrine of personality. There can be no religious education. No religious appeal is possible on this platform. It is really a revamping of the old association of ideas of James Mill, substituting for ideas the conditioned reflex and the various patterns.

2. STRUCTURALISM

Based on examination of structure. There is an analysis of the basic elements of experience. No psychosis without neurosis. It considers the structural aspect of experience as being subjective as distinguished from the function or cognitive side (James). Wundt speaks of observed processes. There is an existential or descriptive view of mind. Ebbinghaus would analyze the complex into simple parts, work out structure, consider the changes to which various parts are subjected, and register the developmental history of both structure and changes. Studies especially attention, sensation, simple feeling and action.

Madison Bentley argues for the psychological organism as the principal factor. Against the biological and spiritual interpretation of psychology, he sets forth this view: the total or psychological organism, which gives us one unitary system described in part in experiential and in part in bodily terms is the vital element.

Criticism: This is largely only a method of psychological approach. It is limited in sphere, and needs the supplementary doctrine of functionalism. In itself it has no doctrine of personality, and might be postulated on a spiritual ego, the nervous system or the endocrine glands. It is vague and limited in its treatment of personality.

3. FUNCTIONALISM

This view may be biological or personal. The former admits that there is purposiveness in life which must be taken into account, but contends that there is nothing about this purposiveness which needs to go beyond the needs of the biological organism. The latter admits that there is a central organizing power of personality which is not to be confused with automatic reactions to stimuli. With this personality goes a consciousness which while greatly conditioned by the physical organism, is, nevertheless able to exert some power over it, and make it follow the lines of an inner purpose.

Mind is an organic device for adjustment to environment. This theory gives the *how* and *why* of our processes of conscious adjustment. It is qualified to handle such aspects of mental life as perception, thinking, conation.

Criticism: This, too, is largely a method of approach in psychology and needs to be buttressed by the tenets of structuralism. It is one sided, and, as the name implies, deals largely with the functional reactions of the psychic organism in experience. It may be spiritual or naturalistic. But being closely allied with naturalistic evolution, it is usually naturalistic. Its tendency is towards a purely objective treatment of psychology. While differing radically from behaviorism, it has many elements in it that lead to this later theory. J. R. Angell is a representative.

4. THE DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

Robt. S. Woodworth belongs to this school. This is really a reaction against the intellectualist psychology of the last

century. Man is more than a mere thinking machine. There is an inherent drive in human nature that explains its psychic life. This drive may vary in its nature from pure naturalism to a form of spiritualism. It may be some form of kinetic energy, the power of habit, the dominant interests, purpose, desire, feelings and the various instincts. It may be the infantile eroticism of Freud or the power tendency of Adler. It may be the collective unconscious of Jung. This embodies itself in an autonomous complex which in man, by a law of compensation, assumes a feminine aspect, the anima, and in woman, the masculine aspect, the animus. The real self freeing itself from the false wrappings of the persona, or mask, that hides its essential nature, must come to terms with the unconscious and by an act of individuation become a single, discrete being.

Criticism: There is much truth in this theory, especially in the view that man is more than a mere thinking machine. It calls attention to the drive or push in human experience. It is vague in defining the nature of this drive. This is usually naturalistic. It has no clear-cut doctrine of the self.

5. THE GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Represented by Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Koehler. Man in his psychological studies can make a report not only of a functional, but also of a descriptive nature. He possesses consciousness. The various qualities in experience are always known upon a ground. There are the given qualities and the background upon which it appears. These constitute mental configurations. We find even in our

most elementary reactions not a mere assembling of disparate elements, but unitary, articulate meaningful wholes, to which we apply the name of Gestalt or configuration. This theory is based largely on a study of the intelligence of apes by Wolfgang Koehler. Experimented from 1913-1917 with certain chimpanzees. He found that their problems were solved by sudden insight and not by the trial and error method. There is a sudden illumination that can only be predicated on the facts of consciousness and purpose.

Criticism: This view does justice to consciousness. It really makes all perception conception. It points in the direction of a doctrine of personality, but is vague in its own views. It is based upon a limited induction, a study of the mentality of apes and the problem of perception. Perhaps later on it will turn its attention to the wider problems of human psychology. It does not do proper justice to the demands of personality, to thinking in general, or to the moral and religious side of our being.

6. PURPOSIVE PSYCHOLOGIES

Represented by such men as Morton Prince and William McDougall. This is a protest against the mechanistic, behavioristic interpretation of experience, which either does away with consciousness or reduces it to the role of a steam whistle on a locomotive. It is a plea for consciousness, purpose and the efficacy of desires, motives, emotions and thought in human experience. The defence against behaviorism takes various forms. Morton Prince holds that there is an identification of consciousness with the reality of brain processes, and that the unknown reality behind electrical units and units of energy is of the same nature

which is known as conscious experience. The sum of the dispositions organized as a whole into neurograms or organized dispositions constitutes personality.

"Man or robots?" asks McDougall. A robot is an ingenious machine so put together that it can perform much of the routine labour now performed by men. McDougall contends that man is not a machine, but a purposive being. He protests against the idea psychology in that it gives us no intelligible theory of action. He advances the Hormic theory of action. The driving power in life is in the instincts. The inner or affective sides of these constitute the emotions. Here we find the genesis of purpose.

Criticism: In general the position of this type of psychological theory is sound and constitutes a wholesome reaction against the automaton psychology of the behaviorists. The only trouble is, that it does not go far enough; it does not postulate a real doctrine of spiritual personality that functions in experience. It tries to ground the sense of purpose on purely naturalistic foundations. On the one hand, it lays itself liable to all of the criticisms of the behaviorists that its postulates are magical and mystical, and, on the other, it fails to secure the stability that a clear-cut doctrine of personality would insure. Like all mediating theories, it is not entirely satisfactory to any camp of thought.

7. PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGIES

These hold that experience can be interpreted and made rational only by a doctrine of a real personality that abides as an integrating factor in all experience and which directs the individual in a purposive way. This personality

is "super" natural, and cannot be explained in terms of mechanism or naturalism. It has moral and spiritual appetencies. It cannot be evolved from the lower elements of life, but is created in the divine image. The purpose of this book is to defend such a thesis, and to show that it, and it alone, gives a scientific and rational interpretation of all the elements of experience.

APPENDIX II

AN OUTLINE OF BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY



1. PERSONALITY

The Old Testament is not metaphysical, but practical. It views spiritual realities under material symbols. The Spirit takes its name from the might and majesty of the wind. The Old Testament largely makes use of the concept of power rather than of substance. In loins the strength is located. The reins or kidneys are the seat of the will. The heart is the center of personality. In the background of all Old Testament thought is conscious personality. Created in the Divine Image (Gen. 1:27). Can interact with its environment. Intercourse with God (Gen. 28, 3:8-13). There is commerce with the forces of evil (Gen. 3:1-7). Hope held out for salvation (Gen. 3:15).

We come now to the position of Jesus. What of Christ as a philosopher and psychologist? His intellect was intuitive, concrete, positive and creative (Dr. H. H. Horne, in *The Biblical Review* for July, 1927). He does not seem so much to be seeking the truth as possessing and really being the truth. His philosophy and psychology are implicit rather than explicit. Would you say that in His method of testing lives and religious professions He was a pragmatist? His teaching implies the objective reality of space and time. Human personality and God are the fundamental realities. The physical is the sphere of action of the spiritual. To Him reality was essentially personal.

His universe is a moral order. Man and his redemption are the center of interest in this spiritual order.

In His teachings He accentuated the primacy of the spiritual. Note that personality is the thing of supreme value (Matt. 16:26, Mark 8:36-37). Note how Jesus rates the soul in comparison with the mere animal side of existence (Matt. 6:25-34). In the light of these teachings how would Jesus regard behaviorism with its denial of personality and even of consciousness and its reduction of all mental life to mere mechanical stimulation and response? Note that Jesus teaches that a man's acts flow from and are conditioned by his nature (Matt. 7:17-18ff). He is the foe of all shallow sensationalism or behaviorism in psychology. The forces to be feared are not those that affect the body but the soul (Matt. 10:28).

2. THE REASON

The Bible has a twofold attitude to human reason. The first I would style "The Immanence of Religion." It is within reach of human reason and subject to its laws. It does not contradict the fundamental laws of thought. The Old Testament has an underlying philosophy. The reasonableness of virtue and religion and the folly of vice are manifest in the wisdom literature. God calls sinners to come and reason with Him (Isa. 1:18, Hosea 14, and all the prophets).

In the New Testament Christianity is presented as a reasonable religion. The Christ is God's Word or Logos (Gospel of John). Justification by faith is a reasonable act (Romans, chapters 1-8). The person of Christ constitutes the highest wisdom (Colossians). The cross is the supreme exhibition of wisdom (I Cor. 1:24).

Next I would note the "Transcendence" of Christianity to human reason. At the same time, it is above human wisdom (Isa. 55:9). The wisdom of this world knows not God (I Cor., chapters 1 and 2). The natural man cannot know God (I Cor. 2:14). The divine revelation is not made to the worldly wise (Matt. 11:25-26).

3. THE EMOTIONS

In the sense of an irrational, direct intuition or sensation, feeling plays no part in Biblical psychology. This is contrary to the popular view that the feelings are at the basis of conviction and assurance, and also to the modernistic view that the feelings are the essence of religion.

Love as an emotion that is a rational response of man's whole personality is most vital in Christian psychology. Love to God and to man is the very essence of true religion (Deut. 6:5, Matt. 22:37ff). This emotion is at the basis of the new commandment (John 13:34). It should be the inner dynamic for Christian service (John 21:15ff). Negatively, we are not to love the world (I John 2:15). It is the test of the new birth (I John 3:14). It is the fulfilling of the law (Rom 13:10).

4. THE WILL

In the Old Testament sin largely consists in self-will and in the rebellion of the people against God. Men are called upon to surrender their wills to God. Sacrifice and worship should be offered in the spirit of good will.

Jesus teaches a form of voluntarism in religion as opposed to an empty intellectualism. Consider the necessity of doing His will rather than making mere lip statements

(Matt. 7:21-23). Note that He conditions knowledge on obedience or willing, and thus teaches a sort of will-to-believe conception in religion (John 7:17). In his redemptive ministry He appeals to a man's will rather than to his intellect or emotions (John 5:6). The appeal of Jesus is not to some isolated faculty of man's being, but to his whole personality. In John 14:6 we see this threefold appeal. He is the Way (appeal to the will), the truth (the intellectual appeal) and the Life (the satisfaction for the emotions). He construes His mission, not primarily as intellectualistic or emotional, but as intended to bring life to the whole being of man (John 10:10, 1:4, 6:48). He calls for man's complete consecration of all his faculties to God (Matt. 22:37, Luke 10:27). His ideal is simplicity and unity of vision, life and service (Matt. 6:22-23). Paul is afraid that the Corinthians will lose this simplicity in Christ (II Cor. 11:3). One charm of Christ's life is that it is absolutely simple and unified about a common love to God and man. It lacks the disturbances, divisions and turmoils of our neurotic living. It is a model of poise, equanimity and serenity.

5. DANGER OF THE DIVIDED LIFE

Note the danger of repressing sin in the depths of a man's being as seen in Psalm 32:3-5. Note how harmony is restored thru confession (Psalm 32:1-2). Study Psalm 51 in the light of the danger to psychic harmony of trying to repress a sin or complex in the depths of the soul, and of the value of restoring sanity and unity to personality thru confession of sin.

Jesus taught, not only the inadvisability, but the sheer impossibility, of living successfully the divided life. No man

can serve two masters (Matt. 6:24, Luke 16:13). A divided soul will fall (Matt. 12:25ff, Luke 11:17ff). He would simplify and unify life by calling on men to love the kingdom supremely (Matt. 6:33), or by having them surrender entirely to His Lordship (Matt. 16:24). He is utterly opposed to the modern doctrine that thru reckless self-expression and defiance of all authority, a man can attain real personality. It is only thru spiritual repression of all base instincts and of the very self itself that a man can come to real expression and find his true being and happiness (Luke 9:23-24ff).

Paul, in Romans 7:15-25, gives us a classic example of the danger of trying to live the divided life. It is a passionate struggle between two diverse laws, and the struggle at times almost reaches the status of dissociated personalities. But psychic unity and moral poise are attained thru the Gospel of Grace. In Romans 8 we have the calm after the storm. Here the attainment of real personality thru Christ is seen as the goal of all religion. The consciousness of this attainment of peace thru a resting on the Divine Purposes leads Paul into the very Holy of Holies of a divine truth. This assurance brings him to the very door of heaven (Romans 8:35-39).

6. THE ATTENTION

The Bible throughout recognizes the necessity of engaging man's attention and of holding it on spiritual realities. It uses every method of sound religious pedagogy to reach and to hold the attention. Its appeal is concrete, not abstract, pictorial, not didactic, short and pointed rather than prolix and discursive. In the Psalms the problem seems to be that of securing God's attention (17:1, 55:2, 61:1). In Proverbs

the problem is that of holding man's attention on higher things (Prov. 4:2, 4:20, 5:1, 7:24).

Jesus was a master hand in securing men's attention. His matchless parables are models of how to hold attention. He would lead the truly interested into the very secrets of His revelation; but the superficial He would not bring further than the mere story itself (Matt. 13:10-15). Then follows the judicial hardening of the heart and attention (Matt. 13:13-15). His matchless parable of the Sower (Matt. 13:3ff) is really a study of the use of attention in matters religious. The four types of the reception of the seed are cases of the use or misuse of attention. The seed that fell by the wayside was never really attended to at all and never penetrated into the depths of man's personality. The seed on stony ground received only superficial attention, issued only in lip profession and not in real character and service. The seed among thorns is a case of attention divided between the World and the Truth. Hence there was no real harvest. The good seed was really attended to, penetrated into the depths of man's being, and thru the work of the Spirit yielded a bountiful harvest.

The basis of attention is interest and character (Prov. 4:23). Jesus recognizes that attention goes back to the state of heart and its treasures (Matt. 6:21).

7. MEMORY

The faculty of memory plays a most important role in the Bible and especially in the Old Testament. God's people are called upon to remember His day, His commandments, His mercies of the past, His punishment of sin, the attacks of their enemies, His gracious covenant,

their humble position as slaves in the past, the fact that He is their Creator and Redeemer. The Old Testament being centered about great historic transactions in the past, predicates much of its religious life and appeal on the use of the faculty of memory.

In the New Testament this function is not so prominent. Jesus calls on true worshippers to use memory at the altar in a sort of spiritual diagnosis and psycho-analysis (Matt. 5:23ff). It is the use of memory that brings Peter to repentance and tears (Matt. 26:75). Dives in his lost condition still has the faculty of memory and is commanded to use it (Luke 16:25).

8. THE IMAGINATION

One feature of the Old Testament is its photographic reality (chapter 4, *The Preacher's Old Testament*, by Mack). It is intensely imaginative. Language is pictorial and imaginative. Alphabet is derived from pictures representing the various letters. Dramatic element is prominent. The old Bible is a drama of the soul. The use of the imagination is prominent in the Psalms and prophets—especially Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Major Povah, in *The Old Testament and Modern Problems in Psychology* (page 89), teaches that a false prophet proclaims from his own unconscious mind the prejudices and passions that lie buried in the collective unconscious of his crowd. This is an illuminating suggestion. Now as to what part the unconscious mind plays in true prophecy, we had better be very cautious in our statements. Surely the Bible does not teach that the unconscious mind with its race and sex symbols is the source of prophecy. This a direct revelation from God's Spirit. As to how far the

Spirit may use the mechanism of the subconscious and unconscious in delivering the message, I am uncertain.


The Old Testament is intensely imaginative. Even the language and tenses use not the abstract, static, cinematographic method of philosophy, but give us the fluid, dynamic, personal touch of experience. Its language does not jump from one stone of thought to another, but swims down the stream of experience (Major Povah).

The imaginative element is prominent in the New Testament. There can be no proper exegesis without a recognition that the Bible is an imaginative book and the Hebrew people an imaginative people. Note the wide use of the parables (especially the nature parables of Jesus).

Take an apocalyptic book like Ezekiel or Daniel, and study the use of the imagination. Try to discriminate between the reproductive imagination which brings back scenes and pictures of the prophet's own time, and the productive imagination which thru God's Spirit portrays new pictures.

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